Regional dimensions of the financial and economic crisis by Davies, Sara et al.
Davies, Sara and Kah, S. and Woods, C. (2010) Regional dimensions of 
the financial and economic crisis. [Report] , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/28843/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
  
 
 
 
 
Regional Dimensions of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis 
 
 
Sara Davies, Stefan Kah and Charlie Woods 
 
 
February 2010 
European Policy Research Paper 
Number 70 
 
 
 
Published by: 
 
European Policies Research Centre 
University of Strathclyde 
40 George Street 
Glasgow G1 1QE 
United Kingdom 
 
ISBN: 1-871130-76-X 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Policies Research Centre 
University of Strathclyde 
40 George Street 
Glasgow G1 1QE 
 
Tel: +44 141 548 3932 
Fax: +44 141 548 4898 
 
 
Author emails: 
sara.davies@strath.ac.uk 
stefan.kah@strath.ac.uk 
charlie.woods@strath.ac.uk 
 
 
www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc
Regional Dimensions of the Financial and Economic Crisis 
Preface 
This paper has been prepared by the European Policies Research Centre (EPRC) under the 
aegis of EoRPA (European Regional Policy Research Consortium), which is a grouping of 
national government authorities from countries across Europe. The Consortium provides 
sponsorship for the EPRC to undertake regular monitoring and comparative analysis of the 
regional policies of European countries and the inter-relationships with EU Cohesion and 
Competition policies. EoRPA members currently comprise the following partners: 
Austria 
x Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery), Vienna 
 
Finland 
x Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (Ministry of Employment and Economy), Helsinki 
 
France 
x Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement et à la compétitivité des territoires 
(DIACT), Paris 
 
Germany 
x Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (Federal Ministry for Economics and 
Labour), Berlin 
x Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Energie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Ministry of Economics, SMEs and Energy of the Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen) 
 
Italy 
x Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic Development), 
Dipartimento per lo sviluppo e la coesione economica (Department for Development 
and Economic Cohesion), Rome 
 
Netherlands 
x Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Ministry of Economic Affairs), The Hague 
 
Norway 
x Kommunal-Og Regionaldepartementet (Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development), Oslo 
 
Poland 
x Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (Ministry of Regional Development), Warsaw 
 
Sweden 
x Näringsdepartementet (Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications), 
Stockholm 
 
United Kingdom 
x Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, London 
x The Scottish Government, Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department, 
Glasgow 
 
The research for this paper was undertaken by EPRC in consultation with EoRPA partners. It 
involved a programme of desk research and fieldwork visits among national and regional 
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authorities in sponsoring countries during the first half of 2009. It was originally prepared 
for the  
The paper has been drafted by Sara Davies, Stefan Kah and Charlie Woods. It draws on 
country-specific research contributed by the following research team: 
x Dr Sara Davies (Germany) x Dr Irene McMaster and Dr Katja Mirwaldt 
(EU12) together with country specialists 
x Dr Martin Ferry (Poland) x Carlos Méndez (Portugal, Spain) 
x Dr Martin Ferry & Rona Michie (United 
Kingdom) 
x Dr Katja Mirwaldt (Luxembourg) 
x Fiona Wishlade and Frederike Gross 
(France) 
x Laura Polverari (Italy) 
x Frederike Gross and Dr Katja Mirwaldt 
(Belgium) 
x Victoria Chorafa, LKN (Greece) 
x Professor Henrik Halkier (Denmark) x Heidi Vironen (Finland, Sweden) 
x Stefan Kah (Austria) x Professor Douglas Yuill (The 
Netherlands, Norway) 
x Dr Irene McMaster (Ireland)  
Thanks are also due to Michael Comerford for research assistance provided. 
Many thanks are due to everyone who participated in the research. The European Policies 
Research Centre also gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by the 
members of the EoRPA Consortium. 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
It should be noted that the content and conclusions of this paper do not necessarily 
represent the views of individual members of the EoRPA Consortium. 
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REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY IN THE CRISIS 
The international economy has experienced significant difficulties in the past year, with a 
crisis in the financial sector, initially in the United States, spilling over to all countries and 
regions and triggering a serious economic recession. All regions have been affected, 
although to varying degrees, depending on their initial situation, their sectoral exposure to 
the crisis, and the response of national and regional authorities. There is considerable 
uncertainty over the path of recovery, despite better economic data in recent weeks, but a 
period of relatively low growth rates and economic adjustment seems likely. 
From a policy perspective, the financial crisis and recession have demonstrated the 
importance of macroeconomic and regulatory policies, both nationally and, perhaps 
particularly, in terms of coordinated international action, both at EU level and more 
widely. Many European governments have included a regional dimension in their response 
the crisis, either by channelling additional funds through existing regional policy 
instruments or through other policies that explicitly target all or selected regions, or by 
targeting geographically concentrated sectors or activities.  
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS 
While the crisis began in the financial sector in the United States, it quickly developed into 
a wider economic recession as credit dried up, confidence deteriorated, asset prices fell 
and demand declined when firms and households retrenched. The European Commission 
estimates that world GDP will fall by -1.4 percent in 2009 (compared to an increase of 4.9 
percent in 2005-07) and that the EUs GDP will fall by -4.0 percent in 2009 (compared to a 
rise of 2.6 percent in 2005-07). Although growth is forecast to become positive again by the 
third quarter of 2009, employment rates are continuing to fall, damping recovery. While 
the financial sector and housing market of some countries has been affected directly, in 
many European countries the main channel of impact has been the dramatic fall in 
international demand for goods and services, which has led to a significant fall in exports 
and private investment. Consumption has cushioned the reduction in economic activity in 
many countries, largely due to government intervention, but consumption has fallen in 
some countries which had seen credit-fuelled asset bubbles in recent years, or which have 
been particularly badly affected by the flight of capital from countries perceived as riskier. 
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INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES’ MACROECONOMIC RESPONSES 
Countries responses have varied, depending on the specific impact of the crisis and the 
macroeconomic situation before the crisis. However, some common elements in the 
governmental response can be discerned.  
First, governments have provided support for the financial system, for example by injecting 
capital into troubled banks, by providing large-scale guarantees for bank lending, by 
enhancing deposit guarantees for savers and by raising capital reserve requirements. Even 
where banks were not directly involved in riskier borrowing and lending practices before 
the crisis, they have been affected by constraints on inter-bank lending and in turn have 
become more cautious in lending to businesses and households. 
Second, central banks have loosened monetary policy, mainly by cutting nominal interest 
rates but in some cases also via quantitative easing or the direct injection of liquidity into 
the financial system with the aim of raising levels of bank lending. However, in some 
countries outside the Euro area, central banks have been reluctant to cut nominal interest 
rates too hard for fear of triggering further currency depreciations. 
Third, governments have allowed the automatic stabilisers to work via the tax and benefit 
system. As the level of tax revenues falls and the level of social benefits automatically 
increases in a recession, these mechanisms increase demand at the level of the economy as 
a whole. 
Last, many governments have introduced packages of discretionary fiscal measures in the 
form of tax cuts and additional spending aimed supporting household consumption, 
maintaining employment, stimulating business investment and raising public investment. 
However, in the countries worst affected by the crisis, the scale of such fiscal policy 
interventions are small and often based on the reallocation of existing resources. Indeed, 
some governments have already had to shift to a contractionary fiscal stance, raising taxes 
and cutting spending. 
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE IN EUROPE 
There have also been significant international responses to the crisis, involving co-ordinated 
action between central banks and governments, for example via G20 summits, as well as 
the allocation of assistance to individual countries by the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World 
Bank. The European Union has also agreed the European Economic Recovery Plan, which 
involves a range of actions, including steps to increase the flexibility of rules, for example 
governing State aid, public procurement and Cohesion policy, as well as the allocation of 
additional funding, notably to the European Investment Bank to support SME loans and 
investment in green technology and infrastructure projects. 
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THE CRISIS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Data on the regional impact of the crisis are limited; in most countries, up-to-date monthly 
or quarterly data on a regional basis are only available for unemployment rates. In many 
countries, these data show that the dispersion of regional unemployment rates (estimated 
via coefficients of variation) fell between June 2008 and June 2009, indicating that regional 
disparities in unemployment rates have narrowed, generally because unemployment rates 
have risen faster in some regions which previously had lower unemployment rates. In other 
countries, there has been little change in the aggregate level of regional unemployment 
disparities, even though there have usually been changes in the ranking of regions in terms 
of unemployment rates in this period. 
One set of factors that is shaping the impact of the crisis on the economic development of 
different regions is their initial strengths and weaknesses. This includes the size of their 
internal market and their access to larger external markets, as well as endowments in 
natural resources and in physical, human and knowledge capital. The situation of individual 
regions is also conditioned by the broader national context. In a number of countries, 
structurally weaker regions are among those which have been most seriously affected by 
the crisis. There are also concerns that the longer-term impact of the crisis could be more 
serious in these regions, where the loss of even relatively small numbers of firms and jobs 
could have significant effects, particularly if these losses lead to reduced demand for goods 
and services from other local firms. 
A further dimension that is shaping the impact of the crisis on specific regions is their 
sectoral structure. In general, a regions vulnerability to adverse economic shocks is seen to 
be correlated with its sectoral specialisation, although the degree of regional specialisation 
has decreased in Europe since the 1950s, not least due to the expansion of public and some 
private services in all regions. In 2008-09, some sectors have been directly affected by the 
first stages of the downturn, notably financial services, export-oriented manufacturing and 
the construction industry, while other sectors have mainly experienced second-wave falls in 
demand. Regions which specialise in a narrow range of sectors are particularly vulnerable 
to sectoral shocks; a key concern in such regions is that the recession could permanently 
reduce the number of firms and jobs in core sectors, leading to a structurally lower level of 
output and employment even after the downturn has passed. 
REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
Although the main focus of all governments response to the crisis has been national rather 
than regional, the discretionary fiscal policies introduced by most governments include 
some explicit or implicit regional dimension. 
In some countries, the crisis has led to the allocation of additional funding or to changes in 
eligibility rules in core regional policy instruments. The scale of new measures varies, with 
only Germany using existing regional policy instruments as a core component of central 
State fiscal stimulus packages. In other countries, changes are more limited, and take the 
form of small rises in funding allocations or shifts in eligibility requirements. A number of 
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countries have also introduced changes in Cohesion policy programmes and have taken 
advantage of the changes introduced by the Commission in response to the crisis. Some 
countries are also taking steps to improve cooperation and to mobilise all available 
resources and information in order to increase the effectiveness of policy responses to local 
and regional difficulties. In a minority of countries, the need to release funds to address 
the crisis has led to a reallocation of resources away from regional policy and towards other 
policy instruments. Lastly, governmental authorities in some countries argue that the 
recession should not be allowed to stimulate shifts in regional policy because it is a long-
term structural policy which should not be used to address cyclical problems. 
Many countries are channelling additional fiscal resources through the regional or local 
level outside the sphere of active regional policy. In some cases, funds are being targeted 
at particular locations that are strongly affected by the crisis, for example due to the 
closure of large businesses or plants. In others, new central State resources are being 
allocated to all regions, often in the form of new funding for local authorities, particularly 
for investment in local infrastructure. Moreover, some regional or local authorities are 
developing their own responses to the crisis, usually by drawing on new resources from the 
central State or by reorienting existing funding. 
Other interventions have an implicit regional dimension, as they focus on sectors or 
activities that are more prevalent in some regions than in others (but aim primarily to 
support national economic growth and employment). Most countries have introduced some 
measures which target particular sectors (notably the financial services, automotives, 
construction and renewable energies sectors) and in many countries these sectors are 
regionally concentrated. Governments have also allocated additional funding to activities 
such as investment in public infrastructure and R&D, which are likely benefit some regions 
more than others. However, some governments are already cutting some components of 
public infrastructure spending, which is likely to have a negative effect on the development 
of individual regions or localities. 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
There remains significant uncertainty over the shape of economic recovery. Although the 
EU as a whole is estimated to have moved out of recession by the third quarter in 2009, it is 
not yet clear whether this recovery can be sustained, particularly as it is at present driven 
by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. There remain questions over the functioning 
of financial markets and some individual banks, leading to ongoing constraints on bank 
lending to businesses and households. Persistently weak demand also means that further 
bankruptcies and job losses are likely, and this may continue to mute household spending. 
International discussions are underway on exit strategies from existing expansionary 
macroeconomic policies. There are concerns that fiscal and monetary policies should not be 
tightened too soon, nor in all countries at once, and also that measures are in place to 
address the imbalances generated by these expansionary policies. 
A further issue is whether the crisis will stimulate longer-term structural changes in the 
international economy. In particular, without a significant recovery in private sector 
activity and associated tax revenues, the level of public indebtedness is likely to lead to 
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higher taxes and/or lower public spending in many countries, with potential knock-on 
effects on private sector activity. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether significant 
changes will be seen in the financial sector, whether in the form of stricter regulation, 
shifts in the strategies of financial institutions, or increased risk aversion on the part of 
businesses and households. Where economic growth has been fuelled by the rapid 
expansion of credit in recent years, such changes could have long-term effects on growth 
rates. Further uncertainties relate to the possible effects of the crisis on EU integration, as 
well as on the broader international rebalancing between net creditor and net debtor 
countries at a global level. 
The impact of the crisis on different regions is likely to vary significantly, depending on the 
national economic situation, on the regions initial economic situation and on their sectoral 
structure. Although the crisis has been rooted in innovation and internationalisation in the 
financial services sector, there is as yet no evidence that the (mainly metropolitan) regions 
specialising in this sector have been particularly badly affected, nor that the economic 
importance of these regions is diminishing. Instead, the strongest impact has so far been 
seen mainly in structurally weaker regions and in manufacturing regions. 
The impact of the crisis on regional policy is also likely to vary between countries. While 
regional policy has been an element of the response to the crisis in some countries, funding 
for regional policy instruments has been cut in others. It is likely that funding for regional 
development will be constrained in many countries in the medium-term, along with other 
public spending categories, as governments endeavour to reduce public indebtedness. In 
such a context, policy-makers may need to find ways of increasing the effectiveness and 
value-for-money of regional policy, for example by further emphasising collaborative, 
bottom-up approaches that mobilise existing actors and resources.  
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REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Significant shifts have occurred in the international economy in the past year, as deep-
rooted problems have emerged in the financial system, spilling over into all countries and 
economic sectors. Although all European regions have been affected to some degree by the 
financial crisis and subsequent economic recession, the most severe difficulties have been 
seen where there were existing vulnerabilities, either because of structural economic 
weaknesses or because of strong sectoral specialisation. The crisis has raised many 
questions about the functioning of the financial and economic system, but has also 
demonstrated the importance of the role of government and of coordinated international 
action, both at EU level and more widely. The responses of European governments illustrate 
the varied ways in which the regional dimensions of economic difficulty can be addressed, 
either through active regional policy, or through other policies that explicitly target all or 
selected regions, or through the indirect regional effects of sectoral or thematic policies. 
Although brighter economic data has emerged in recent weeks, there remains considerable 
uncertainty over the path of recovery and over the strategies that governments will need to 
pursue in order to facilitate a return to sustained growth and employment creation. 
Section 2 provides an overview of the evolution of the crisis, focusing particularly on 
European countries. Section 3 examines the macroeconomic responses of European 
countries to the crisis, including support for the financial sector, monetary policy and fiscal 
policy. Section 4 considers the international response to the crisis, particularly the 
interventions of European Union (EU) authorities, as well as international financial 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Section 5 then turns to the 
regional dimension and explores the impact of the crisis on regional economic 
development. Section 6 examines how government responses to the crisis are affecting 
regions, while Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS 
2.1 The roots of the crisis 
The economic recession of 2008-09 began with a financial crisis, which resulted from the 
bursting of a property bubble in the United States (US), with difficulties already emerging 
as early as 2006. The bubble had been boosted by the issuing of so-called sub prime 
mortgages at low interest rates to less credit-worthy customers on lower quality properties. 
These mortgages were then securitised through different financial derivatives and sold on 
to a range of financial institutions. The securitisation was intended to spread the risk 
involved in sub prime mortgages, and the ratings agencies often gave the securities very 
high scores. While house prices continued to rise, significant profits were made in the 
development and trading of these products. However, when prices began to fall, as defaults 
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on sub prime mortgages grew and housing supply overtook demand, the whole system began 
to unravel. 
Many financial institutions found themselves overexposed to the consequences of the 
collapse as a result of the rapid growth in the development and trading of complex, 
mortgage-backed financial instruments and the high levels of borrowing taken on to finance 
trading in these products . The complex nature of these instruments also made it difficult 
to make a clear assessment of the true exposure of financial institutions. Those institutions 
that were heavily reliant on raising funds in wholesale money markets were particularly 
vulnerable as liquidity began to dry up when confidence fell. 
The real and perceived weaknesses of many financial institutions led to a rapid loss of 
confidence (which was exacerbated by domino effects in integrated global financial 
markets); a severe contraction in liquidity (as lenders became very risk averse - this was a 
particular problem in the inter-bank market); and the insolvency or near-insolvency of a 
number of institutions at the core of the financial system (as asset valuations were marked 
down sharply). The default of the investment bank Lehman Brothers and the rescue of the 
insurance company AIG by the US government in September 2008 marked a watershed in 
the crisis.   
2.2 From financial to economic crisis 
The financial crisis quickly developed into a wider economic recession as credit dried up, 
confidence deteriorated, asset prices fell (and with them the value of savings and pension 
funds), and demand declined when firms and households retrenched, cutting spending and 
raising saving levels. This was particularly pronounced in countries, such as the US and 
United Kingdom (UK), where household debt had increased significantly in the previous 
decade as rising house prices helped to fuel consumption.  
In this environment, one firms cost-cutting and stock reduction quickly became another 
firms lost revenue as a vicious cycle of decline developed. The crisis rapidly transformed 
economic expectations, leading to further impacts on confidence as firms and households 
struggled to adapt and plan for the future. 
The European Commission estimates that world GDP will fall by -1.4 percent in 2009, 
compared to an increase of 4.9 percent in 2005-07 (see Table 1). Similarly, the volume of 
world trade is estimated to fall by -11.5 percent in 2009, compared to an increase of 8.3 
percent in 2005-07. Despite differences between countries, none has been completely 
immune from the crisis as the global nature of the problem is one of the most significant 
features of the crisis. In the past some countries have avoided cyclical downturns that have 
afflicted others and have helped to stimulate economic recovery. Nevertheless, the 
transmission mechanisms have varied between countries. In debtor countries with large 
current account deficits (particularly the US but also, for example, the UK), the initial 
impact occurred through the drying up of credit, which led to falls in consumption and 
investment, whereas in creditor countries with large current account surpluses (especially 
China and other emerging markets, but also, for example, Germany) saw a contraction in 
output as export demand fell.  
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Table 1: World GDP, unemployment, trade and current accounts, 2005-07 and 2009 
GDP at constant 
prices, average 
annual % change 
Exports of goods and 
services, average 
annual % change 
Current account 
balance (in billion 
US dollars)P 
 
2005-07 2009 2005-07 2009 2005-07 2009 
Industrialised 
countries 
2.7 -3.6 6.5 -12.8 -754.8 
-760.6 
EU 2.6 -4.0 6.5 -12.7 -62.4 -146.7 
USA 2.5 -2.9 8.1 -14.0 -818.8 -640.2 
Japan 2.1 -5.3 8.3 -18.4 93.3 85.6 
CIS 7.8 -3.8 8.7 -7.8 131.2 59.9 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
6.7 1.5 5.7 -8.3 333.3 
52.3 
Asia (excluding 
Japan & Middle 
East) 
9.0 3.3 14.3 -9.6 305.7 
489.0 
Latin America 5.2 -1.6 7.4 -11.0 83.7 -3.4 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
3.7 -3.7 2.2 -9.2 39.2 
24.4 
World 4.9 -1.4 8.3 -11.5 138.1 -138.4 
Source: DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009b). 
2.3 The recession in Europe 
Although all countries have been affected by the crisis, the extent of the downturn and its 
economic impact are partly shaped by their initial situation. In general, difficulties are 
more severe in countries with existing imbalances, such as overvalued asset markets, low 
domestic savings rates, high government indebtedness or high external deficits.1 Countries 
with more robust economies before the crisis, characterised by solid economic growth, low 
unemployment levels, as well as current account and government surpluses, should be 
better able to weather the storm, although they are far from immune. 
The European Commissions May 2009 forecast showed significant falls in economic growth 
in the second half of 2008 and in 2009 (see Table 2).2 The strongest declines in 2009 were 
forecast for Latvia (-13.1 percent), Lithuania (-11.0 percent) and Estonia (-10.3 percent) 
but negative growth was forecast for all countries except Cyprus, with the EU as a whole 
forecast to see a fall of -4.0 percent in GDP. The European Commission published a revised 
economic forecast for the EU in mid September 2009, based on an analysis of the seven 
major Member State economies (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, UK), 
but did not significantly change its forecast compared to its more comprehensive analysis of 
May 2009 (see Table 3).3 Although the figures for the second and third quarter of 2009 are 
                                                 
1 DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009a) Public Finances in EMU, European Economy 5. 
2 DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009b) Economic forecast: spring 2009, European Economy 3.  
3 DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009c) Interim forecast: September 2009, European Economy. 
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better than expected, the figures for the first quarter are worse, so that there is little 
change in the forecast for the year 2009 as a whole.  
Table 2: Economic growth, investment, unemployment and saving, 2005-07 and 2009 
GDP at 
constant prices 
(average 
annual change) 
GFCF (average 
annual change) 
 
Unemployment 
rate 
 
Private saving as 
% of GDP 
 
2005-
07 2009 
2005-
07 2009 
2005-
07 2009 
2005-
07 2009 
Austria 3.1 -4.0 3.1 -11.6 4.8 6.0 23.6 25.8 
Belgium 2.5 -3.5 5.9 -6.2 8.1 8.5 22.6 23.4 
Bulgaria 6.2 -1.6 19.5 -12.7 8.7 7.3 7.4 8.9 
Cyprus 4.1 0.3 7.1 1.7 4.6 4.7 9.6 7.1 
Czech Rep 6.4 -2.7 4.3 -5.1 6.8 6.1 20.4 18.9 
Denmark 2.3 -3.3 5.8 -9.1 4.2 5.2 18.3 20.9 
Estonia 8.4 -10.3 10.8 -20.7 6.2 11.3 15.3 19.1 
Finland 3.9 -4.7 5.2 -8.5 7.7 8.9 20.1 20.0 
France 2.1 -3.0 4.7 -5.9 8.9 9.6 18.1 18.6 
Germany 1.8 -5.4 3.3 -10.3 9.6 8.6 23.3 22.6 
Greece 3.7 -0.9 4.5 -5.6 9.0 9.1 11.7 10.1 
Hungary 2.6 -6.3 1.3 -10.6 7.4 9.5 19.5 17.2 
Ireland 6.0 -9.0 4.2 -29.2 4.5 13.3 18.2 22.8 
Italy 1.3 -4.4 1.7 -12.3 6.9 8.8 18.7 16.6 
Latvia 10.9 -13.1 14.3 -24.0 7.2 15.7 14.1 32.7 
Lithuania 8.2 -11.0 16.5 -22.1 6.1 13.8 13.0 21.4 
Luxembourg 5.6 -3.0 3.4 -2.3 4.5 7.0 24.4 20.8 
Malta 3.5 -0.9 3.4 3.4 6.9 7.1 14.8 15.1 
Netherlands 2.9 -3.5 5.1 -7.6 3.9 3.9 25.1 24.6 
Poland 5.3 -1.4 11.9 -6.2 13.8 9.9 17.5 19.2 
Portugal 1.3 -3.7 0.5 -14.4 7.9 9.1 14.0 13.7 
Romania 5.9 -4.0 20.7 -6.5 7.0 8.0 12.0 20.1 
Slovakia 8.3 -2.6 11.3 -5.2 13.6 12.0 20.8 21.9 
Slovenia 5.6 -3.4 7.8 -13.9 5.8 6.6 23.0 24.1 
Spain 3.7 -3.2 6.4 -14.7 8.7 17.3 15.5 21.6 
Sweden 3.3 -4.0 8.5 -14.6 6.8 8.4 20.4 23.3 
UK 2.9 -3.8 4.5 -12.3 5.2 8.2 15.3 19.4 
Euro area 2.4 -4.0 4.3 -10.4 8.3 9.9 19.9 20.3 
EU-27 2.6 -4.0 4.9 -10.5 8.1 9.4 19.0 20.2 
Norway 2.7 -3.4 10.9 -9.8 3.6 3.1 18.6 14.6 
Source: DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009b) and own calculations using DG Economic and 
Financial Affairs AMECO database. 
Although labour market indicators typically lag other demand-related indicators, many 
countries were seeing falling employment by early or mid 2009. The impact on employment 
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has been muted in some countries by the extensive use of short-time working and similar 
measures (e.g. Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands). In the longer term, 
fiscal constraints in a number of countries are likely to act as a further obstacle to 
employment creation. According to the European Commissions May 2009 forecast, the fall 
in employment will be most severe in Estonia, Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania (over -10 
percent in 2009-10 each case). The impact of the crisis on the labour market in Spain has 
been particularly strong, with the unemployment rate forecast to rise from 8.7 percent in 
2005-07 to 17.3 percent in 2009. This is partly due to the continued rise in the number of 
the economically active population in Spain, largely due to high levels of immigration in 
recent years. In addition, a large percentage of workers are on temporary contracts, which 
allows employers to lay off staff easily. Moreover, Spains economic growth in recent years 
has been based on a boom in construction and related sectors, but demand has now 
collapsed due to the direct effects of the credit crunch, so that the construction sector 
accounts for over 60 percent of the fall in employment.  
Table 3: Real GDP growth in 2009, forecasts of May 2009 and September 2009 
Quarterly GDP forecast 2009 (% change, 
quarter-on-quarter) 
Annual GDP forecast 2009 
(% change, year-on-year) 
 
 
 
2009/1 2009/2 2009/3 2009/4 May 2009 September 
2009 
France -1.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 -3.0 -2.1 
Germany -3.5 0.3 0.7 0.1 -5.4 -5.1 
Italy -2.7 -0.5 0.2 0.1 -4.4 -5.0 
Netherlands -2.7 -0.9 -0.4 0.0 -3.5 -4.5 
Poland 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 -1.4 1.0 
Spain -1.6 -1.1 -0.4 -0.2 -3.2 -3.7 
UK -2.4 -0.7 0.2 0.5 -3.8 -4.3 
Euro area -2.5 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -4.0 -4.0 
EU-27 -2.4 -0.2 0.2 0.1 -4.0 -4.0 
Source: DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009c) 
The financial sector in all countries has been affected by the crisis, although to varying 
degrees. Differences are partly due to the scale of the financial sector in different 
countries (with Eurostat data showing that the financial and property services sector 
accounts for over 10 percent of employment in Luxembourg and around five percent in 
Cyprus and Ireland, but less than 1.5 percent of employment in Lithuania and Romania) but 
also due to the extent to which banks were directly involved in riskier lending and 
borrowing practices. Banks in a number of countries (e.g. Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands and UK) have needed State intervention to survive, often 
leading to a degree of restructuring and job losses. In the UK, for example, the 
Confederation of British Industry estimates that over 40,000 jobs will be lost in the sector 
between October 2008 and June 2009. In other countries (e.g. Austria and Sweden), 
domestic difficulties are limited but banks are facing a degree of risk due to their activities 
in central European and Baltic markets, where economic problems imply a greater risk of 
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default on household and business loans.4 Lastly, the financial sector of some countries has 
experienced spillover effects as international inter-bank lending has been squeezed but 
there have been no severe difficulties in individual banks. Banking problems have been 
more limited in countries which had already introduced stringent regulatory frameworks 
following earlier crises (Finland, Norway), or where banks did not engage in higher risk 
lending (Italy, Poland). A degree of normality was seen to have returned to the 
international financial system by September 2009 but there were ongoing uncertainties over 
the longer-term losses in individual banks.5 
The decrease in bank liquidity, linked to the tightening of rules on bank reserve ratios and 
concerns over debt defaults, has led to constraints on bank lending to businesses and 
households. The knock-on effects of the credit shock have been limited to an extent in 
countries with lower business and household debt ratios, without asset price bubbles, and 
with more conservative lending practices (e.g. Finland, Norway, Sweden). However, effects 
can be serious even in countries with these characteristics if firms depend strongly on bank 
credit rather than other sources of financing (e.g. Italy).  
                                                 
4 OECD (2008) Economic Surveys: Sweden, Paris; OECD (2009a) Economic Surveys: Aust ria. 
5 European Commission (2009c) Op. Cit . 
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Table 4: Inflation, public indebtedness and current account balance, 2005-07 and 2009 
Harmonised 
index of 
consumer prices 
(average annual 
change) 
General 
government 
balance as % of 
GDP 
General 
government 
gross debt as % 
of GDP 
Current account 
balance as % of 
GDP 
 
2005-
07 2009 
2005-
07 2009 2005-07 2009 
2005-
07 2009 
Austria 2.0 0.5 -1.2 -4.2 61.7 70.4 2.6 2.7 
Belgium 2.2 0.3 -0.9 -4.5 88.0 95.7 2.6 -2.0 
Bulgaria 7.0 3.9 1.7 -0.5 23.4 16.0 -17.5 -18.8 
Cyprus 2.1 1.1 -0.1 -1.9 64.4 47.5 -8.2 -13.9 
Czech Rep 2.2 1.1 -2.3 -4.3 29.4 33.7 -1.8 -3.2 
Denmark 1.8 0.9 5.0 -1.5 31.7 32.5 2.6 0.4 
Estonia 4.9 0.6 2.4 -3.0 4.1 6.8 -15.0 -1.1 
Finland 1.2 1.3 4.0 -0.8 38.6 39.7 4.3 1.4 
France 1.8 0.2 -2.6 -6.6 64.6 79.7 -2.2 -4.3 
Germany 2.0 0.3 -1.7 -3.9 66.8 73.4 6.4 3.6 
Greece 3.3 1.8 -3.8 -5.1 96.5 103.4 -12.0 -11.5 
Hungary 4.8 4.4 -7.3 -3.4 64.4 80.8 -7.1 -5.0 
Ireland 2.6 -1.3 1.6 -12.0 25.8 61.2 -4.0 -1.8 
Italy 2.1 0.8 -3.0 -4.5 105.3 113.0 -1.7 -2.6 
Latvia 7.7 4.6 -0.4 -11.1 10.7 34.1 -19.2 -1.5 
Lithuania 3.9 3.6 -0.6 -5.4 17.8 22.6 -10.9 -1.9 
Luxembourg 3.1 -0.6 1.7 -1.5 6.6 16.0 10.4 6.1 
Malta 1.7 1.0 -2.6 -3.6 65.2 67.0 -8.0 -7.6 
Netherlands 1.6 1.4 0.2 -3.4 48.3 57.0 9.0 5.7 
Poland 2.0 2.6 -3.4 -6.6 46.6 53.6 -3.1 -4.7 
Portugal 2.5 -0.3 -4.2 -6.5 63.9 75.4 -10.0 -9.8 
Romania 6.7 5.8 -2.0 -5.1 13.6 18.2 -11.0 -7.4 
Slovakia 2.8 2.0 -2.7 -4.7 31.3 32.2 -7.0 -7.5 
Slovenia 2.9 0.7 -0.7 -5.5 25.7 29.3 -2.7 -4.6 
Spain 3.2 -0.1 1.7 -8.6 39.6 50.8 -8.9 -6.9 
Sweden 1.3 1.6 2.9 -2.6 45.8 44.0 7.9 7.0 
UK 2.2 1.0 -2.9 -11.5 43.3 68.4 -3.0 -2.8 
Euro area 2.2 0.4 -1.5 -5.3 68.1 77.7 0.2 -1.4 
EU-27 2.3 0.9 -1.5 -6.0 60.9 72.6 -0.4 -1.6 
Norway 1.4 1.4 17.1 13.6 50.7 n/a 16.5 7.0 
Source: DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009b) and AMECO database. 
Policy-makers in various countries (e.g. France, Germany, Norway) report increased 
business demand for public loans and grants as banks have tightened business lending and 
have raised interest rates on business loans. Business investment has fallen in all partner 
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countries, with the reduction in investment seen most strongly in relation to gross fixed 
capital formation in equipment,6 partly due to tighter credit conditions but also due to the 
fall in demand for goods and services from other businesses and from households. The 
reduction in private investment has been particularly strong in Sweden, as well as in 
Austria, Germany, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland.7 
All countries have been strongly affected by the negative impact of the downturn on 
demand for exports, not least in countries where net exports have played an important part 
in overall economic growth in recent years (e.g. Germany, Finland, Italy and Poland). The 
downturn in export demand has had negative knock-on effects, as exporters have cut their 
demand for inputs and services, leading to further falls in employment and investment. 
Ongoing difficulties are likely to be seen in countries (e.g. Austria, Sweden, Finland) with 
strong trade links with those central European countries undergoing very severe recessions. 
Countries outside the Euro area have generally seen their currencies depreciate relative to 
the Euro (see Table 5), leading to greater export competitiveness but also more expensive 
imports. In contrast, exporters in those Euro area countries which also serve external 
export markets have experienced difficulties; for example, Ireland has seen a loss of export 
competitiveness in UK markets as Sterling has depreciated relative to the Euro. 
Table 5: Exchange rates relative to the Euro, July 2008- July 2009 
 July 2008 October 2008 January 2009 April 2009 July 2009 
Czech Rep. 23.95 24.22 27.88 26.70 25.57 
Hungary 231.26 261.43 299.08 289.73 266.53 
Poland 3.21 3.60 4.46 4.40 4.16 
Romania 3.51 3.68 4.31 4.19 4.22 
Sweden 9.46 9.91 10.61 10.69 10.34 
UK 0.79 0.79 0.90 0.89 0.86 
Norway 8.02 8.53 8.89 8.72 8.72 
Note: Through their membership of ERM II, the exchange rates of Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania are effectively fixed to the Euro and have not fluctuated during this period. 
Source: European Central Bank. 
Further external factors have affected specific countries. The transport and logistics sector 
is of particular importance in the Dutch economy, for example, with significant transit 
traffic via Schiphol airport and Rotterdams port, and these have been affected by the 
overall decline in cargo and passenger transport. The impact of the recession on Europes 
tourism sector in summer 2009 is as yet unclear but results for the second quarter of 2009 
show a fall of around 10 percent in international arrivals in western and southern Europe, 
and a fall of around 13 percent in central and eastern Europe.8 Figures, however, vary 
                                                 
6 European Commission (2009c) Op. Cit . 
7 DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009d) The EU's response t o support  t he real economy during t he 
economic crisis: an overview of  Member St at es' recovery measures, European Economy Occasional 
Papers 51. 
8 European Travel Commission (2009) European Tourism 2009 – Trends & Prospect s, Quart erly report  
Q2 2009, Brussels. 
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across countries, with a much lower fall in the second quarter seen for example in Austria. 
Moreover, increases in oil and gas prices in 2009 have had positive effects in Norway, not 
only by ensuring ongoing demand for oil exploration, but also by providing resources which 
reduce concerns over future budgetary constraints. 
Overall, the impact on EU-wide consumption has been relatively limited (with consumption 
estimated to have fallen by -0.75 percent in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter 
of 2009) due to disinflation and to government support via automatic stabilisers and 
discretionary fiscal measures including support for short-time working.9 However, the 
picture varies across countries, depending not least on the extent of credit-fuelled booms 
in recent years. Consumption has fallen most strongly in some central European countries 
(notably Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania), as well as in Ireland.10 In contrast, consumption 
has fallen very little in countries such as Austria, Germany and Italy, where households 
have a strong saving propensity and where consumption was already constrained before the 
crisis. However, consumption in all countries has been affected by precautionary saving in 
the face of economic uncertainty and concerns over future job losses. The impact of the 
fall in consumption is generally more serious in the case of lower income households and 
those in precarious employment, especially in countries (e.g. Italy) where welfare and 
income support systems are less generous or do not cover workers on more flexible 
employment contracts.  
Falls on previously overvalued housing markets have led to a significant reduction in 
activity in the construction sector and have contributed to lower consumption in some 
countries (e.g. Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Spain, UK). The impact on aggregate demand has 
been particularly strong where housing booms were fuelled by high levels of household debt 
in recent years. In a number of central European countries, difficulties have emerged as the 
depreciation of domestic currencies has had a severe effect on the many households which 
took out mortgages in foreign currencies (notably Euros, U.S. dollars or Swiss francs) due to 
the pre-crisis availability of loans at lower interest rates. Other countries (e.g. Finland, 
France) have also seen strong rises in house prices in recent years but only a limited impact 
on household consumption, not least because of stricter lending conditions on mortgages 
and household credit.11 In these countries, the main effect of constraints on mortgage 
lending has been reduced activity in the construction sector.  
                                                 
9 European Commission (2009c) Op. Cit . 
10 European Commission (2009b) Op. Cit . 
11 OECD (2009b) Economic Surveys: France. 
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Box 1: Central Europe and the Baltic countries  
The impact of the recession has varied considerably across the ten central European and 
Baltic States which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. Effects have been limited in Poland, 
where the main impact has been felt in terms of constraints on bank lending to firms and 
households. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, difficulties have mainly been due 
to the fall in demand for manufacturing exports and the reduction in private investment 
including foreign direct investment. Other countries, however, have been affected more 
seriously (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania). All have seen solid real 
economic growth in recent years, fuelled by access to EU markets and inflows of foreign 
capital, which led to the expansion of investment and consumption, often based on credit 
denominated in foreign currencies, and in some countries leading to a credit-fuelled 
property boom. However, the financial crisis saw a flight to safety, with foreign capital 
pulling out of countries perceived as riskier, and the emergence of liquidity constraints as 
foreign banks instituted restrictions on cross-border lending. 
In countries with flexible exchange rates (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania), the 
flight of foreign capital led to currency depreciations relative to the Euro. While this has 
helped countries export competitiveness, as well as their attractiveness to foreign 
investors, it has also raised the price of imports, fuelling inflation, and, even more 
importantly, has increased the level of business, household and aggregate debt where this 
is denominated in foreign currencies. Some countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland) have 
been concerned that monetary loosening could lead to further depreciations and so have 
aimed mainly to respond to the crisis via expansionary fiscal policy. However, Hungary and 
Romania have been more seriously affected and have had to request international 
assistance, while also introducing contractionary fiscal policies. 
In contrast, Slovakia and Slovenia have enjoyed a degree of protection from uncertainty by 
their membership of the Euro area (which was in any case enabled by a lack of external and 
internal imbalances). However, these countries must now maintain their international 
competitiveness via ongoing real productivity gains rather than currency depreciations. 
A number of other countries had previously pegged their exchange rates to the Euro 
through membership of ERM II (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). All have been strongly 
affected by the recession, which has ended the credit-based booms of recent years and led 
to a fall in exports. Governments have been determined to maintain fixed exchange rates 
with the Euro (partly due to high domestic borrowing in foreign currencies) and are also 
endeavouring to keep public indebtedness low with a view to entering the Euro area as soon 
as possible. This means that adjustment is occurring through falling costs and wages, as 
well as productivity gains. Fiscal policy has contracted, with governments cutting public 
sector salaries, pensions and welfare benefits, and raising taxes.  
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3. INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES’ MACROECONOMIC RESPONSES 
3.1 Common policy responses 
The policy response across the world has had two main goals: 
x to stabilise the banking sector and the financial system in order to prevent 
collapse, to rebuild confidence and to ensure sufficient liquidity to finance 
recovery; 
x to rebuild business and consumer confidence and to stimulate consumption and 
investment in order to prevent recession from turning into depression. 
The responses of individual governments to the crisis have been shaped in part by the 
degree and character of the downturns impact on individual countries, but also by the 
macroeconomic situation of each country before the crisis. Countries with low levels of 
government indebtedness and effective regulatory frameworks before the crisis have been 
better placed to respond effectively. Most governments have introduced a series of 
measures or packages as the downturn has progressed, sometimes over a period of months 
from late 2008 to mid 2009. The active responses of governments can be divided into three 
main categories: support for the financial sector and financial system; monetary policy 
intervention; and discretionary fiscal policy targeted on the real economy. In addition, 
governments have allowed the so-called automatic stabilisers to operate, whereby tax 
receipts fall and welfare payments rise in a downturn, thus providing further government 
support for aggregate demand. 
3.2 Support for the financial system 
Government action to stabilise financial markets and build confidence has included a range 
of measures, which have varied across countries, depending on the severity of the impact 
on the financial sector. Some governments have allocated public grants or loans to banks 
(sometimes involving part or full public ownership on a temporary basis), while many more 
have provided large-scale guarantees for the credit of banks and other lenders. The aim has 
been to increase liquidity by facilitating inter-bank lending and also bank lending to firms 
and households. In addition, governments have increased the level and scope of deposit 
guarantees for savers in order to ensure confidence in the banking system and protect 
households. In some countries, stricter bank regulation has been introduced and banks 
capital reserve requirements have been raised. Some governments have also created so-
called bad banks to take on the impaired assets of banks in difficulty. By mid 2009, 
attention had shifted to the potential need for structural reforms and regulatory changes in 
the financial sector, with the Group of 20 aiming to reach international agreement on bank 
regulation.12 
                                                 
12 Financial Times (2009) Hurdles remain for G20 pact , 6 September 2009. 
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Table 6: Public intervention in the banking sector, percentage of GDP 
 Capital 
injections 
Guarantees Impaired 
assets relief 
Liquidity and 
bank funding 
Total 
Austria 5.0 25.7 0.4 1.6 32.8 
Belgium 5.3 76.6 10.1 n/a 92.0 
Bulgaria      
Cyprus      
Czech Rep      
Denmark 6.1 253.0  0.3 259.4 
Estonia      
Finland  27.7   27.7 
France 1.2 16.6 0.2  18.1 
Germany 4.4 18.6 1.4  24.4 
Greece 2.0 6.1   11.4 
Hungary 1.1 5.9  3.3 7.1 
Ireland 6.6 225.2   231.8 
Italy 1.3 n/a   n/a 
Latvia 1.4 25.7  10.9 37.9 
Lithuania      
Luxembourg 6.9 12.4  0.9 20.2 
Malta      
Netherlands 6.4 34.3 3.9 7.5 52.0 
Poland      
Portugal 2.4 10.0   12.5 
Romania      
Slovakia      
Slovenia  32.8   32.8 
Spain  9.3  2.8 12.1 
Sweden 1.6 48.5  0.1 50.2 
UK 3.5 21.7  16.4 41.6 
EU27 2.6 24.8 0.8 2.9 31.2 
Norway 6.5     
Note: Approved measures cut-off date 17 July 2009; effective total is provisional, cut-off date mid-
May. 
Source: DG Competition (2009) DG Competitions review of guarantee and recapitalisation schemes in 
the financial sector in the current crisis, 7 August. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/review_of_schemes_en.pdf; Own 
calculations for Norway based on EFTA Surveillance Authority decision no 205/09/COL and Eurostat 
data. 
The level of State support for the financial sector varies significantly between countries. 
The highest figures (well over 200 percent of GDP) are seen in Denmark and Ireland, where 
State assistance almost exclusively taking the form of bank guarantees (see Table 6). The 
scale and focus of government funding for the sector depends in part on the extent of 
difficulties faced by domestic banks, with high levels of capital injections for example 
often seen where public resources have been needed to recapitalise individual banks. 
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However, some countries, particularly those with small open economies, have had to 
allocate significant public funding even when domestic banks are fundamentally sound. A 
further important factor affecting the level and focus of intervention has been the state of 
public finances before the crisis; where public indebtedness was already high, governments 
have had less room for manoeuvre in responding to the crisis. 
3.3 Monetary policy  
The European Central Bank (ECB) and the central banks of countries outside the Euro area 
have used monetary policy instruments with the aim of stimulating bank lending and 
economic activity. Intervention has included reductions in nominal interest rates (as shown 
in Table 7). In addition, the UKs central bank (Bank of England) has undertaken 
quantitative easing with the aim of injecting liquidity into the financial system. This 
involves the purchase of government and corporate bonds from financial institutions via 
open market operations; by providing banks with additional funds, quantitative easing 
should in principle raise levels of bank lending. 
Although all central banks in the EU and Norway have introduced some interest rate cuts 
since autumn 2008, rates remain higher in Hungary and Romania than in, for example the 
Euro area. This is largely because of concerns that further interest rate cuts could add to 
existing downward pressure on the currencies of these countries, which have already seen 
significant currency depreciations since mid 2008. Although a fall in the exchange rate 
could raise their export competitiveness, there are concerns over the effects of currency 
volatility, as well as the potential impact on firms and households with debt denominated 
in foreign currencies, and possibly also on inflation in countries with strong openness to 
imports (although inflation rates are generally muted due to the broader effects of the 
recession). 
Table 7: Central Bank policy (repo or base) interest rates, July 2008-July 2009  
 July 2008 October 2008 January 2009 April 2009 July 2009 
ECB 4.25 3.75 2.00 1.25 1.00 
Czech Rep. 3.75 3.50 2.25 1.75 1.50 
Denmark 4.60 5.50 3.00 2.00 1.55 
Hungary 8.50 11.50 9.50 9.50 8.50 
Poland 6.0 5.90 4.80 2.80 3.10 
Romania 10.00 10.25 10.25 10.00 9.00 
Sweden 4.50 3.75 2.00 0.50 0.25 
UK 5.00 4.50 1.50 0.50 0.50 
Norway 5.75 5.45 3.00 2.00 1.25 
Source: Central Banks websites. 
3.4 Fiscal policy 
The fiscal response to the crisis has had two main components: first, the so-called 
automatic stabilisers and, second, discretionary fiscal policy. Automatic stabilisers operate 
through the tax and benefit system, as the level of tax revenues falls and the level of social 
benefits increases in a recession (and vice versa in an economic upturn). The stabilisers 
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should therefore act counter-cyclically and smooth aggregate demand over the business 
cycle. Difficulties can emerge, however, if governments do not build up a surplus during the 
good times which can subsequently be run down in the bad times. Discretionary fiscal 
measures in response to the crisis include support for household consumption, private 
investment, labour market adjustment and public investment.  
There are significant international differences in the scale of the fiscal policy response and, 
in particular, in the extent to which countries rely on automatic stabilisers or different 
components of discretionary fiscal policy.13 In general, countries with larger automatic 
stabilisers have less need for large discretionary responses; this partly explains why the 
discretionary fiscal stimulus is smaller in the EU (1.1 percent of GDP in 2009 and 0.7 
percent in 2010) than in the United States (2.1 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2.4 percent in 
2010).14 In the EU and Norway, the strongest response in terms of discretionary fiscal policy 
is seen in Austria, Finland, Germany, Spain and Sweden (see Table 8).  
The scale of the discretionary fiscal policy response also reflects differences in the impact 
of the crisis on individual countries, as well as their capacity to loosen fiscal policy given 
existing levels of public indebtedness.15 In the EU, gross government debt as a share of GDP 
is forecast to rise from around 61 percent in 2005-07 to over 72 percent in 2009 (see Table 
4), with debt levels over 100 percent of GDP in Greece and Italy, and over 70 percent of 
GDP in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary and Portugal. Increases in general 
government deficits have led the European Commission to institute Excessive Deficit 
Procedures (under Article 104 of the EU Treaty) in relation the UK (June 2008), France, 
Latvia, Ireland, Greece and Spain (all February 2009), and Poland, Romania, Lithuania and 
Malta (all May 2009). 
While most European countries are pursuing expansionary fiscal policies, constraints are 
already apparent in a number of countries. The discretionary fiscal stimulus in countries 
such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania is very low due to the severity of 
economic difficulties, so that governments are reorienting existing resources to support 
business and household demand, rather than allocating additional new resources. In 
Hungary, for example, its initial response in November 2008 was based on the restructuring 
of Cohesion policy and EU Rural development programme funding, while its second package 
in February 2008 released funds for public infrastructure spending and income tax cuts by 
raising VAT rates and cutting pensions and social welfare programmes.  
Constraints are also evident in some countries which have introduced relatively large fiscal 
stimulus packages. Ireland, for example, is raising income tax rates on high earners, as well 
as social insurance contributions, VAT rates and capital gains tax rates, while also cutting 
public sector salaries and pensions. The government is considering further significant cuts 
                                                 
13 A. Fatas (2009) The ef fect iveness of  aut omat ic st abil izers, IMF Workshop on Fiscal Policy, 2 June. 
14 DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009b) Op. Cit ., p.45. 
15 IMF (2009a) Global economic pol icies and prospect s, IMF Staff Note to the G20 Meeting of the 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, March 1314 2009, London. 
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in public employment and social welfare payments16 but is also trying to increase its 
comparative advantage for innovative enterprise, by focusing public investment on the 
most productive projects, retaining low corporate taxes, increasing R&D tax credits, and 
raising tax relief. 
Similarly, both Italy and the UK have taken steps to offset the fiscal impact of some 
measures by cutting other public spending categories or increasing other revenue sources. 
Italy has introduced new taxes, an increase in the minimum retirement age for women, 
measures relating to fiscal evasion, and a reduction in funding for domestic regional policy. 
The UK has announced a reduction in the personal income tax allowance for people with 
incomes over £100,000 from April 2010, as well as a new higher rate of income tax of 45 
percent for those with incomes above £150,000 from April 2011. 
Given the overall uncertainty of the economic situation, it is not surprising that there have 
been debates over the appropriateness and effectiveness of government responses to the 
crisis in most countries. In some cases, questions focus on the scale of the stimulus or the 
types of measure introduced. In Germany, one issue relate to the practical difficulties of 
ensuring that the additional public funding is spent both well and quickly.17 There are, for 
example, concerns that funding could go to poorer quality projects which would not 
otherwise have received funding, and that the funding boost, plus the introduction of 
simpler public procurement rules, could reduce value-for-money. Other criticisms focus on 
particular measures, such as car scrapping subsidies, which are seen to distort economic 
incentives inappropriately.18 In Italy, critics question the limited support for poorer 
households and public investment, as well as the lack of measures to control the growth of 
primary current expenditure despite high levels of public indebtedness, while also arguing 
that the fiscal package could encourage tax evasion.19 
                                                 
16 RTÉ (2009) Cut  publ ic numbers by 17,300 - 'Snip', 16 July 2009, Dublin. 
17 M. Rosenfeld (2009) Die Kommunen in der Finanzkrise: kurzf rist ig Gewinner, langf rist ig Verl ierer, 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Wirtschaft im Wandel. 
18 U. Blum and S. Freye (2009) Die Abwrackprämie - wer zahl t  die Zeche? Halle Institute for Economic 
Research, Press release May 2009. A. Boss and H. Klodt (2009) Mit  dem Konj unkt urpaket  aus der 
Krise? Kiel Institute for the World Economy Policy Brief 2, February 2009. 
19 R. Prodi (2009) Crisi globale e it al ia: t ornare a invest ire, non aspet t iamo l ’ aut unno, Il Messaggero, 
22 July 2009. 
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Table 8: Discretionary fiscal stimulus packages, as a percentage of GDP 
 Fiscal 
stimulus 
2009-10 
Measures 
aimed at 
households 
Labour 
market 
spending 
Measures 
aimed at 
businesses 
Increased 
public 
investment 
Austria 3.5 2.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 
Belgium 1.8 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.3 
Bulgaria 0.1    0.1 
Cyprus 1.8    1.8 
Czech Rep. 2.2 0.1 1.1 0.5 0.5 
Denmark 1.5  1.0  0.4 
Estonia 0.6  0.5  0.1 
Finland 3.8 2.6  0.7 0.4 
France 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 
Germany 3.6 1.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 
Greece 0.3 0.3    
Hungary 0.0     
Ireland 1.4 0.8 0.2 0.4  
Italy 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 
Latvia 0.9 0.6  0.3 0.1 
Lithuania 0.0     
Luxembourg     1.7 
Malta 1.2 0.4  0.2 0.6 
Netherlands 1.6 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.5 
Poland 2.8 1.2  0.4 1.2 
Portugal 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 
Romania 0.3 0.1  0.2  
Slovakia 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Slovenia 2.2  0.8 0.2 1.2 
Spain 4.0 1.6 0.1 1.4 0.9 
Sweden 3.2 0.4 1.8 0.4 0.6 
UK 2.6 1.7 0.3 0.4 0.2 
Norway2) 1.1   0.3 0.8 
Note: 1) Data refer to measures announced between November 2008 and the end of April 2009 i.e. 
does not include further measures announced since then e.g. in Italy. 
2) Data for Norway are drawn from a separate source and may not be consistent with EU data. 
Source: DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009d) p.16 and (for Norway) authors calculations based 
on Norways Ministry of Finance Press release 08/2009. 
3.4.1 Support  for household consumption 
Intervention has focused particularly strongly on household consumption in Greece (total 
funding), in Austria, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Slovakia and the UK (at least half of total 
funding), as well as in Germany and Poland (over one third). In contrast, no additional 
funds have been allocated to supporting household consumption in Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia or Norway. 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 70  European Policies Research Centre 16
Regional Dimensions of the Financial and Economic Crisis 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 70  European Policies Research Centre 17
In a number of countries (Austria, Finland, Poland, Germany, UK), measures have mainly 
involved changes in tax rates and thresholds or broader reforms of income tax systems. In 
Austria, for example, the most expensive single measure in the crisis package is the 
bringing forward of the agreed personal income tax reform from 2010 to 2009, including 
reductions in lower marginal tax rates, and increases in the thresholds of the bottom and 
top income brackets.20 In Poland, a new system of personal income tax has been introduced 
with two tiers of tax rates, while in Germany income tax rates have been reduced. Other 
tax changes include tax cuts on pension income (Finland), VAT reform (Poland), a 
temporary cut in the VAT rate (UK), increased tax credits for children and tax deductible 
childcare (Austria), increased tax exemptions on profits for entrepreneurs and freelancers 
(Austria), an increase in the lowest tax threshold (UK), and a suspension on car tax for new 
cars for two years (Germany). Although some of these measures target low income 
households (e.g. Austrias increase in tax thresholds), many benefit both poorer and richer 
tax-payers. 
In addition, some countries have introduced additional benefits or allowances, often 
focused on children (Austria, Finland, Germany, UK) or pensioners (UK), but also additional 
State funding for statutory health insurance (Germany). Some countries have targeted 
additional support on low income households (Finland, Italy), with Italy in particular 
providing a number of relatively small one-off subsidies to poorer households, such as 
family allowances, rent subsidies and discounts on utility bills.  
Other types of support include subsidies for certain types of expenditure. In Italy, for 
example, the government has capped variable interest rate mortgages in 2009, and 
introduced a freeze on rail fares and motorway fees. Many countries have introduced 
subsidies on the purchase of more energy efficient cars (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, 
Italy, UK) and other durable goods (Italy), as well as tax relief on house repairs and 
extensions (Germany), and support for mortgage payments in the case of job loss (UK). 
Some of these measures are discussed further in Section 3.4.3 because they not only 
support household consumption but are primarily aimed at supporting the automotive and 
construction industries.  
3.4.2 Labour market support  
Labour market measures are likely to benefit both businesses and individual workers, and 
have accounted for at least one half of additional spending in the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Sweden, and at least one third of crisis spending in Italy and Slovenia. 
However, no additional funding has been allocated for labour market support in Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland or Romania. 
A number of countries focus resources on enhancing active labour market policies with the 
aim of assisting unemployed people or workers at risk of losing their jobs to find new work 
(Italy, Norway). Interventions include funding for public employment services that support 
job-matching (Germany, Netherlands, Sweden); work placement schemes and coaching 
                                                 
20 OECD (2009a) Op. Cit .  
Regional Dimensions of the Financial and Economic Crisis 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 70  European Policies Research Centre 18
(Sweden) and training schemes for unemployed people (Finland, Germany, UK); additional 
support to address youth unemployment (Netherlands); increased advisory and training 
support for people at risk of redundancy (UK); and increased funding for employers who 
recruit a long-term unemployed person (Germany, Sweden). Other resources target human 
capital, whether in the form of training schemes for job seekers (Germany), 
apprenticeships (Norway) or broader vocational education (Finland, Netherlands, Sweden). 
In Finland, additional funding has been allocated to the change security programme, 
which brings together local stakeholders to cooperate in providing support for workers 
when firms are making large-scale redundancies, including temporary employment, re-
training and support with job seeking.  
Other measures aim to reduce the costs to businesses of maintaining staff in employment, 
despite the fall in aggregate demand. Social security contributions have been reduced in 
Germany (employee), Finland (employer) and the UK (employee, employer and self-
employed). A number of countries have introduced or extended support for short-time 
working (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Wales in UK), 
generally in the form of State subsidies to firms to retain workers even if the fall in demand 
means that there is no work. In some countries, additional funding is provided to firms that 
provide training for workers during the downturn (Finland, Germany). In Italy, additional 
funding has been provided to support employment in small firms and firms in sectors which 
are not eligible under the mainstream scheme (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, CIG), and 
there have also been increases in flexibility in the CIG scheme, for example by allowing 
workers to receive up to a full salary if undertaking vocational training. In Sweden, 
additional State transfers have been allocated to regional and local authorities in order to 
limit employment cuts.21  
In the Netherlands, an additional form of support has been introduced to subsidise the 
secondment of researchers and other knowledge workers from a firm to a university or 
research institute, if they would otherwise be laid off temporarily. Funding is allocated for 
up to 18 months, both to the institute and to the firm. The aim is to allow firms to retain 
knowledge workers who might otherwise be lost to the sector and/or region when the 
economy recovers. 
3.4.3 Business support  
There a particularly strong focus on providing some form of additional support to businesses 
in Romania (over half of additional funding) and in France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Norway 
and Spain (over one third of funding). Measures include new public resources for business 
aid, changes in the tax system, and other steps, such as the introduction of new procedures 
to accelerate the payment of invoices by public authorities. However, some countries have 
not introduced any additional funding for business support (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania). 
                                                 
21 DG Economic and Financial Affairs (2009a) Op. Cit .  
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Government funding has focused on the provision of loans or loan guarantees to businesses, 
primarily SMEs (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, UK), as well 
as venture capital (Finland, France, UK) and investment grants (Austria, Germany). Funding 
is sometimes targeted on entrepreneurship (Finland) or on R&D and innovation (Austria, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway). An important focus is support for exporting 
(Austria, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, UK), such as enhanced guarantees for 
existing export credit guarantee schemes. In Finland, additional funding has been provided 
to Finnvera, the States financing company, which provides loans, guarantees, venture 
capital and export credit guarantees to firms with resources temporarily extended to firms 
with up to 1,000 employees (up from 250 employees). 
Some tax changes aim specifically to support business investment, for example via more 
favourable depreciation allowances to purchase capital equipment (Austria, Germany, 
Netherlands), a reduced tax rate on the purchase of equipment (Italy), or more generous 
allowances for reinvesting profits (Austria). Other measures are more general, in the form 
of cuts in business tax rates (Italy) or in other tax rates (e.g. VAT rate in the UK, and 
Germanys income tax rate which covers some SMEs). Other changes include more 
favourable rules on the allocation of losses for tax purposes (Norway), higher tax thresholds 
on profits for SMEs (Germany), and a shift from monthly to quarterly VAT payments 
(Netherlands), a reduction in the taxation of foreign profits (UK), as well as more generous 
tax relief for loss-making businesses (UK). 
Some measures focus on particular sectors. The automotive sector is subject to rescue 
loans (Sweden) and R&D aid (Germany, Sweden, UK), as well as grants to households to buy 
more energy efficient cars (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, UK), a temporary 
suspension of taxes on new cars (Germany), loan guarantees to support investment in low 
carbon plant (UK), and a loan fund of 6.5 billion for Peugeot, Renault and Renault (trucks) 
(France). Further funding is earmarked for renewable energies and low-carbon business 
activities (Netherlands, UK). Assistance is also provided to the construction sector, through 
relief for household works (Germany, Sweden), support for housing association lending 
(Netherlands), and funding for the construction of rental housing (Finland), energy efficient 
construction (Austria, Germany, Netherlands) and public infrastructure (see Section 3.4.4). 
Lastly, the removal of the passenger air transport tax at Schiphol makes the airport more 
attractive but also reduces the costs of travelling for business people (Netherlands). 
3.4.4 Public investment 
There is a particularly strong focus on allocating funds for public investment in Bulgaria and 
Cyprus (all new funding), as well as in Malta, Norway, Poland and Slovenia (over half of all 
new funding). Most other countries (except Greece and Ireland) also direct some additional 
resources to this heading. This focus is partly due to the short-to-medium term multiplier 
effects in terms of demand and employment that are created by infrastructure projects, 
but in some countries is also aimed at compensating for the downturn in the housing market 
which has reduced employment demand in the construction industry. 
Some funding is focused on building or renewing large national infrastructure, particularly 
transport networks and hubs, as well as waste water treatment plant and broadband 
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infrastructure (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
UK). In Poland, additional domestic funding has been allocated to co-finance the 
acceleration of Cohesion policy spending which has a strong focus on large transport 
networks. In the Netherlands, various infrastructure projects are being brought forward, 
including those financed by the Economic Structure Enhancing Fund, as well as preparations 
for a new Delta programme to strengthen coastal defences.  
Other national funding is focused on constructing or renovating public infrastructure or 
buildings for which the central State is responsible, such as universities, colleges and 
hospitals (Norway). Some funding is targeted on the fields of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency (Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, UK), as well as on coastal defences and 
national parks (Norway). Further central State resources are being allocated for the 
construction or renovation of local infrastructure, such as schools, care homes and urban 
renewal, with funds often being channelled through regional or local authority budgets 
(Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Norway). 
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4. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE IN EUROPE 
As well as action by national governments, there has been a significant response at a multi-
national level. In part, this has involved co-ordinated action between central banks (e.g. on 
interest rate policy) and governments (e.g. based on discussions at G20 summits in April 
and September 2009). In addition, steps have been taken through multi-national institutions 
such as the European Union (EU), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The EU has also agreed the 
European Economic Recovery Plan, which involves a range of actions, including steps to 
increase the flexibility of rules, for example governing State aid, public procurement and 
Cohesion policy, as well as the allocation of additional funding, notably to the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) to support SME loans and investment in green technology and 
infrastructure projects. 
4.1 International financial assistance 
International assistance to countries facing severe difficulties has been led by the IMF, in 
cooperation with the World Bank, and, in Europe, also with the EU, the EBRD and 
sometimes individual donor countries, notably the Nordic countries. The aim has been to 
restore confidence and stability in the financial and economic systems of individual 
countries experiencing short-term balance-of-payments problems. In return for funding, the 
IMF has required countries to implement policies to ensure balanced budgets, appropriate 
exchange rate policies and bank restructuring and recapitalisation.22 
The provision of IMF funding has been facilitated by the agreement reached at the April 
2009 meeting of the G20 industrialised and emerging market economies to allocate around 
$1.1 trillion for stabilisation programmes, trade support and loans to poorer countries.23 In 
Europe, IMF funding has mainly been channelled through Stand-By Arrangements or loans 
that aim to help countries to address short-term balance-of-payments problems; Hungary, 
Latvia and Romania have all received assistance via this instrument. In addition, Poland has 
gained access to the IMF Flexible Credit Line which provides precautionary support for 
countries with very strong fundamentals and track records and is aimed at crisis prevention.  
EU funding to Member States (Hungary, Latvia and Romania) has been channelled through 
an instrument set up in 1988 to provide medium-term financial assistance for Member 
States' balances of payments.24 In the course of the crisis, EU funds for this instrument have 
been increased from 12 billion to 50 billion. It enables the EU to provide loans to Member 
States outside the Euro area which face external financing constraints. The EU finances the 
loans through borrowing on world markets at more favourable rates than are available to 
countries in difficulty. 
                                                 
22 A. Åslund (2009) Implications of the global financial crisis for Eastern Europe, Development  & 
Transit ion 13, July 2009. 
23 G20 (2009) Leaders statement: The global plan for recovery and reform, London, 2 April 2009. 
24 European Council (2002) Regulation (EC) No 332/2002, Of f icial  Journal  of  t he European 
Communit ies L 53/1.  
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Table 9: International support in response to the financial crisis, in billion Euro 
 Date IMF European 
Union 
World 
Bank, EIB, 
EBRD 
Individual 
donor 
countries 
Total 
Poland April 2009 15.4    15.4 
Hungary Nov. 2008 12.5 6.5 1.0  20.0 
Latvia Dec. 2008 1.7 3.1 0.5 2.2 7.5 
Romania March 2009 12.95 5.0 2.0  19.95 
Belarus January 
2009 
2.0    2.0 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
July 2009 1.1 0.039   1.139 
Iceland Dec. 2008 1.7    1.7 
Serbia January 
2009 
0.39 0.1   0.49 
Ukraine Nov. 2008 12.9    12.9 
Western 
Balkans and 
Turkey 
July 2009  0.15 0.6  0.75 
Notes: 1) Most country funding for Latvia is provided by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (1.8 
billion), plus additional funding from the Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland (0.4 billion). 
2) IMF funding for Poland is equivalent to $20.5 billion, for Belarus $2.5 billion, for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina $1.57 billion, for Iceland $2.1 billion, for Serbia $0.5 billion, and for Ukraine $16.4 
billion. 
Source: Own calculations based on IMF (2009) Regional Economic Out look: Europe: Addressing t he 
Crisis, Washington DC, and European Commission press releases. 
In contrast, EU funding to the Western Balkans, including Serbia, mainly involves the 
reorientation of existing funding for candidate and potential candidate countries through 
the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA).25 The EU can also provide medium- or 
long-term loans or grants through its Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) instrument to 
external countries facing balance-of-payments difficulties, usually in cooperation with IMF 
funding. Such funding is mainly allocated to the Western Balkans, some low-income New 
Independent States, and Mediterranean countries. 
4.2 European Economic Recovery Plan 
Following the European Councils statement on 15 October 2008,26 the European 
Commission published a Communication on 29 October 2008 entitled From financial crisis 
to recovery: a European framework for action. This identified three dimensions that would 
subsequently be developed into an EU-wide recovery action plan, relating to the perceived 
                                                 
25 European Commission (2009a) EU approves €100 mil l ion in budget  support  for Serbia and a €85 
mil l ion f inancial  crisis package for t he Western Balkans and Turkey, Press release 31 July 2009.  
26 European Council (2008a) Presidency conclusions, 15-16 October 2008. 
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need for a new financial market architecture at EU level; action to manage the impact of 
the crisis on the real economy; and a collaborative global response to the crisis.27 
On this basis, the Commission Communication on 26 November 2008 set out a European 
Economic Recovery Plan,28 which was subsequently agreed by the Member States at the 
European Council of 11-12 December 2008.29 The Plan described monetary and fiscal policy 
measures aimed at supporting the real economy and boosting confidence, notably the 
mobilisation of around 1.5 percent of EU GDP or 200 billion, mainly in the form of 
measures already approved by Member State governments. The Plan also outlined ten 
action areas of support for the real economy that aimed to reinforce EU competitiveness in 
the longer term: (i) launch a major European employment support initiative; (ii) create 
demand for labour; (iii) enhance access to financing for business; (iv) reduce administrative 
burdens and promote entrepreneurship; (v) step up investments to modernise Europe's 
infrastructure; (vi) improve energy efficiency in buildings; (vii) promote the rapid take-up 
of green products; (viii) increase investment in R&D, innovation and education; (ix) 
develop clean technologies for cars and construction; (x) high-speed Internet for all. Other 
action followed, such as the introduction of accelerated public procurement procedures for 
all major public projects.30 One important measure was an increase in funding for the 
European Investment Bank (30 billion) in 2009-10, especially for SME loans, as well as the 
creation of a European Fund for Energy, Climate Change and Infrastructure. 
A further Commission Communication was published on 4 March 2009,31 calling for effective 
coordination to support recovery and for Member State agreement on a new package of 
financial sector reform measures, including a new supervisory framework for the EU's 
financial sector. It also invited Member States to take the necessary action to ensure long-
term financial stability as soon as economic conditions allowed, and to ensure the 
implementation of their national recovery plans and structural reform programmes. 
In June 2009, the Commission published an additional Communication32 that emphasised 
the EUs shared commitment to employment and calling on Member States and other actors 
to ensure appropriate support for employment in the recession, not least by facilitating the 
appropriate use of Community funds, including Cohesion policy resources. 
4.3 State aid 
Since autumn 2008 the European Commission has reframed State aid rules to take account 
of the economic and financial crisis, based on Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty, which states 
                                                 
27 European Commission (2008a) From f inancial  crisis t o recovery: A European f ramework for act ion, 
COM(2008) 706 final, 2 October 2008. 
28 European Commission (2008b) A European Economic Recovery Plan, 800 final, 26 November 2008.  
29 European Council (2009) Presidency Conclusions of  European Council  11-12 December 2008, 
17271/1/08, 13 February 2009.  
30 European Commission (2008c) Publ ic procurement : Commission recognises need for accelerat ed 
procurement  procedure, Press release 19 December 2008. 
31 European Commission (2009b) Driving European Recovery, 114 final, 4 March 2009. 
32 European Commission (2009c) A shared commit ment  for employment , 257 final, 3 June 2009. 
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that: Aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest 
or remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State [may be compatible 
with the common market]. The Commission has introduced four Communications setting out 
its approach to State aid for the financial sector in the crisis, as well as a fifth 
Communication relating to State aid for the real economy. Further discussion of the EU 
approach can be found in EoRPA Paper 09/5. 
The Commissions Communications on aid to the financial sector followed the agreement 
between Member States in October 2008 to implement national rescue packages aimed at 
safeguarding the stability of the banking sector, restoring the normal functioning of 
wholesale credit markets and sustaining the supply of credit to the economy.33 The four 
Communications are applicable until the end of 2010 and include guidance on: 
x Member State support for the banking sector, ensuring compatibility with the State 
aid rules and swift authorisation of support such as guarantees or recapitalisation;34 
x Member State recapitalisation of financially sound banks facing temporary 
difficulties;35 
x Member State treatment of impaired assets such as underperforming loans and US 
sub-prime mortgage backed securities;36 
x Member State aid for bank restructuring.37 
The Commission Communication on State aid for the real economy in December 2008 
allowed the Commission to authorise measures that facilitated access to finance.38 The 
Temporary Framework allows measures that unblock bank lending to firms and thereby 
guarantee continuity in access to finance, and also facilitates aid schemes that encourage 
continued investment. Proposed measures must be notified and approved by the 
Commission prior to implementation, but thereafter individual aid within the terms of the 
approved scheme can be offered immediately and without further notification. The 
framework comprises both new instruments and the (temporary) modification of existing 
                                                 
33 European Council (2008b) Immediate responses t o f inancial  t urmoil, Council Conclusions - Ecofin 
Council of 7 October 2008, Press release 13930/08, Luxembourg.  
34 European Commission (2008d) Communicat ion on t he appl icat ion of  St at e aid rules t o measures 
t aken in relat ion t o f inancial  inst it ut ions in t he cont ext  of  t he current  global  f inancial  crisis, OJEU 
No. C270/8 of 25 October 2008. 
35
 European Commission (2009d) Communicat ion on t he recapit al isat ion of  f inancial  inst it ut ions in 
t he current  f inancial  crisis: l imit at ion of  aid t o t he minimum necessary and safeguards against  undue 
dist ort ions of  compet it ion, OJEU C10/2 of 15 January 2009. 
36
 European Commission (2009e) Communicat ion on t he t reat ment  of  impaired asset s in t he 
Communit y banking sect or, OJEU C72/1 of 26 March 2009.  
37 European Commission (2009f) Communicat ion on t he ret urn t o viabil i t y and t he assessment  of  
rest ruct uring measures in t he f inancial sect or in t he current  crisis under t he St at e aid rules, OJEU 
C195/9 of 19 August 2009.  
38 The consolidated version including the February 2009 amendments is published as: European 
Commission (2009g) Temporary Communit y f ramework for St at e aid measures t o support  access t o 
f inance in t he current  f inancial  and economic crisis, OJEU C83/1 of 7 April 2009.  
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instruments. The key forms of aid which can be authorised under the framework include: (i) 
a lump sum of up to 500,000 per undertaking; (ii) State guarantees for loans at a reduced 
premium; (iii) subsidised interest rates; (iv) soft loans for green products; (v) risk capital; 
and (vi) export credit insurance.  
4.4 Cohesion policy 
The Commission introduced a series of measures between November 2008 and July 2009 
with the aim of accelerating the implementation of Cohesion policy and providing 
additional flexibility to Member States in using Cohesion policy resources to address the 
crisis. The European Economic Recovery Plan of 26 November 2009 stated that, among 
other measures, the Commission would propose changes in the regulations governing the 
2007-09 Structural Funds programmes with the aim of enhancing the flow of funds to 
appropriate projects. These changes would increase advance payments; encourage the 
front-loading of programmes with EU funds; facilitate the implementation of major projects 
and financial engineering funds; simplify the treatment of advances paid to beneficiaries; 
increase the use of flat-rate payments; and allow funds to be shifted toward energy-
efficiency investments, including in social housing.39 This Communication was followed by a 
series of Commission proposals to the Parliament and Council to amend the Structural 
Funds regulations in order to allow these changes to be introduced.  
A Commission Communication on 16 December 2008 set out a more comprehensive view of 
the role of Cohesion policy in responding to the crisis.40 It outlined a series of 
recommendations to the Member States, and noted the legislative changes proposed. It also 
stated that it would work with Member States to increase flexibility, notably by allowing 
domestic authorities to reallocate funds in the 2007-13 programmes in order to accelerate 
spending; to shift funds towards support for energy efficiency and renewable energy 
investment in housing; and to extend the final date for eligibility of expenditure for the 
2000-06 period by six months. 
A further proposed legislative change followed on 24 February 2009, which allowed Member 
States greater flexibility in closing the 2000-06 programmes.41 According to the Structural 
Funds regulations, Member States are obliged to ensure that there is little divergence 
between the final financial tables and the actual funds declared for each programme, EU 
Fund and priority. Where the divergence is greater than the legal ceiling, the Commission 
does not pay out funds to the Member State. In February 2009 the ceiling was raised from 
two percent to ten percent of funds for the period 2000-06, thus allowing Member States to 
claim a larger amount of EU funds than would otherwise have been possible. 
In addition, in June 2009, Commissioner Hübner announced that the Commission would 
introduce an exceptional change for 2009 only, namely to extend the n+2 rule on automatic 
                                                 
39 European Commission (2008b) Op. Cit . 
40 European Commission (2008e) Cohesion Pol icy: invest ing in t he real  economy, COM(2008) 876 final. 
41 European Commission (2009h) Commission increases f lexibi l i t y of  st ruct ural  funds in response t o 
f inancial  crisis, Press release February 24 2009. 
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decommitment (n+3 in poorer Member States) for an additional year, so that programmes 
would have three years (or four years in poorer Member States) in which to absorb funds 
committed.42 
The third Commission Communication was published on 22 July 2009 and introduced various 
measures aimed at simplifying the implementation of Cohesion policy,43 including the 
possibility for ESF projects to receive 100 percent finance from EU funds in 2009-10; the 
introduction of a single threshold of 50 million for projects to be defined as major 
projects; the simplification of rules relating to 'revenue-generating' projects; changes in 
rules on decommitment so that, for example, grants to major projects would be treated as 
having been paid out as soon as the Member State submitted the project to the Commission 
(rather than from the date of the Commissions approval); and the extension of eligibility 
rules on ERDF funding for housing to include support for communities faced with social 
exclusion, particularly Roma, in both rural and urban areas. 
                                                 
42 Commissioner Hübner (2009) Meeting with the regional offices, 25 June 2009, Brussels, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/samecki/pdf/2009/25062009_regoff.pdf 
43 European Commission (2009i) Proposal for a Council  Regulat ion amending Regulat ion (EC) No 
1083/ 2006 concerning general  provisions on t he European Regional  Development  Fund, t he European 
Social  Fund and t he Cohesion Fund as regards simpl if icat ion of  cert ain requirements and as regards 
cert ain provisions relat ing t o f inancial  management , 22 July 2009, COM(2009) 384 final.  
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5. THE CRISIS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
5.1 The impact of the crisis on regional unemployment rates 
Although the crisis and recession are international, they are affecting regional economies in 
different ways, for example depending on the regions existing strengths or weaknesses, its 
sectoral structure and the response of national and regional governments. Studies have 
examined the effects of economic upturns and downturns in the past on regional economic 
convergence. In many countries, periods of economic growth are associated with regional 
convergence as business opportunities spread to less developed regions, while severe 
recessions can trigger regional divergence as more vulnerable regions are more seriously 
affected in downturns.44 In some countries, however, downturns can lead to narrower 
interregional disparities, particularly where the economies of lagging regions depend on 
protected sectors such as public services or agriculture and thus are relatively unaffected. 
The aim of this section is to provide an initial analysis of the regional impact of the crisis in 
the EU and Norway. This assessment is, however, constrained by the limited regional data 
available. Table 10 provides an overview of regional disparities in unemployment rates in 
June 2008 and June 2009. No other up-to-date regional data were found on a monthly (or 
quarterly) basis across a large sample of countries. However, an analysis based only on 
regional unemployment data has limitations. For example, unemployment rates may not 
fully reflect the extent of problems in some structurally weaker regions where a long-run 
lack of employment opportunities may mean that laid-off workers are more likely either to 
leave the formal labour market or to leave the region. Similarly, firms in some countries 
and regions have been slow to lay off workers despite the recession, particularly where 
public aid is available to support short-time working and similar practices. In addition, 
unemployment rates may not reflect the loss of jobs in countries and regions with large 
numbers of foreign workers on temporary contracts if those workers return to their home 
country or region when they become unemployed. 
It should also be noted that the data in Table 10 can only be compared across time and not 
across countries. This is partly because data are drawn from national sources and, in 
particular, some refer to the number of registered unemployed while others are based on 
the Labour Force Survey methodology. In addition, the definition of a region used varies 
across countries, for example NUTS 1, NUTS 2 or NUTS 3; in general, the index of regional 
disparities (coefficient of variation) is larger when more disaggregated data are used (e.g. 
NUTS 3) because such data include more extreme outliers. Lastly, some data were not 
available for June 2008 and 2009 and, in these cases, data for the nearest month or quarter 
are shown instead. 
                                                 
44 A. Kangasharju and S. Pekkala (2004) Increasing regional disparities in the 1990s: the Finnish 
experience, Regional St udies 38, 255267. R. Martin (1993) Remapping British Regional Policy: The 
End of the North-South Divide? Regional St udies 27:8. 
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Table 10: The dispersion of regional unemployment rates, 2008 and 2009 
 
Regional 
level 
National 
unemploy-
ment rate, 
June 2008 
National 
unemploy-
ment rate, 
June 2009 
Dispersion of 
regional 
unemploymen
t rates, June 
2008 
(coefficient of 
variation) 
Dispersion of 
regional 
unemployment 
rates, June 
2009 
(coefficient of 
variation) 
Austria NUTS 2 4.8 6.3 0.29 0.20 
Belgium  6.5 7.8   
Bulgaria NUTS 2 7.4 7.3 0.29 0.28 
Cyprus  3.3 5.2   
Czech Rep. NUTS 3 5.0 8.0 0.37 0.30 
Denmark NUTS 3 1.7 3.8 0.45 0.24 
Estonia  4.0 13.5   
Finland NUTS 2 7.1 9.6 0.26 0.21 
France NUTS 2 7.2 8.7 0.18 0.15 
Germany Land 7.5 8.1 0.38 0.33 
Greece NUTS 2 7.3 8.6 0.31 0.28 
Hungary NUTS 2 8.0 9.7 0.43 0.31 
Ireland  5.9 11.9   
Italy NUTS 2 7.1 7.9 0.56 0.46 
Latvia  6.3 17.2   
Lithuania  4.6 15.1   
Luxembourg  4.4 5.4   
Malta  5.6 6.8   
Netherlands NUTS 2 4.0 4.8 0.19  
Poland NUTS 2 11.1 11.2 0.25 0.26 
Portugal NUTS 2 7.3 9.1 0.20 0.20 
Romania NUTS 3 3.8 5.8 0.41 0.33 
Slovakia NUTS 3 7.4 11.8 0.60 0.45 
Slovenia NUTS 3 6.4 9.1 0.35 0.27 
Spain NUTS 2 10.4 17.9 0.35 0.28 
Sweden NUTS 3 2.2 3.9 0.18 0.17 
UK NUTS 1 5.4 7.8 0.23 0.19 
Norway NUTS 3 1.5 2.7 0.35 0.19 
Notes: 1) Data are not comparable between countries as they are based on national sources and 
different definitions. 
2) Data for Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK refer to quarters 2/2008 and 
2/2009; data for Italy refer to quarters 1/2008 and 1/2009; data for Poland refer to March 2008 and 
March 2009.  
3) Data for Czech Republic, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden relate to registered unemployed 
and data for other countries are based on the Labour Force Survey methodology. 
4) Data for France exclude overseas departments; data for Spain exclude Ceuta y Melilla. 
Source: Own calculations based on national sources. 
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Regional disparities in unemployment rates in Table 10 are estimated on the basis of 
coefficients of variation. In most countries, the coefficient of variation is smaller in June 
2009 than in June 2008, indicating that the dispersion of regional unemployment rates has 
narrowed, usually due to a larger rise in rates in stronger regions than in structurally 
weaker regions. However, the regional dispersion has changed very little in some countries 
(Bulgaria, France, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Sweden), indicating that there has been no 
real shift in the overall dispersion of regional unemployment rates in this period. Even in 
these countries, however, the impact of the crisis on individual regions has varied 
significantly, with specific regions rising or falling in regional unemployment rate rankings. 
The scale and shape of the recessions impact on individual regions are driven by a number 
of different factors. The following sections examine how regional impact is conditioned by 
regions initial economic situation, including regional fragility and the degree of regional 
sectoral specialisation. Other factors may also contribute to variations across regions but 
are not explored in this section as no clear evidence was found of their impact. For 
example, it is possible that the fall in bank lending to businesses or households could affect 
regions differently, or that certain types of households could be more seriously affected by 
the recession and that these could be disproportionately located in certain regions. 
Similarly, the extent to which government responses to the crisis benefit particular kinds of 
region (a theme explored in Section 6) may also shape the impact of the recession on 
individual regions. 
5.2 The extent of regional fragility 
One important set of factors that is shaping the impact of the crisis on the economic 
development of different regions is their initial strengths and weaknesses. This includes the 
size of their internal market and their access to larger external markets, as well as 
endowments in natural resources and in physical, human and knowledge capital. Similarly, 
the density of existing networks of firms matters, as well as the sectors in which they are 
concentrated (see Section 5.3). The regions situation is also shaped by broader national 
factors, notably the extent to which the country as whole was in a robust state before the 
crisis, with sustained growth, limited unemployment, a lack of external and internal 
imbalances, and sound institutional frameworks. 
The extent of regional fragility can be assessed via indicators such as GDP per capita, 
unemployment and employment rates, and population density (see Table 11). Although 
regional data are not available on other important indicators at national and regional levels 
(e.g. investment, consumption, government spending and savings rates), the indicators in 
Table 11 indirectly reflect the impact of other factors on the regional economy. 
The different indicators illustrate different aspects of vulnerability. The lower levels of GDP 
per capita in most central European regions, as well as in a significant number of regions in 
Greece, Italy and Portugal, reflects the lower productivity and employment levels in these 
regions. Productivity levels are in turn shaped by the availability of physical, human and 
knowledge capital, as well as broader factors such as market access and the functioning of 
institutions.  
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Table 11: The degree of regional fragility, 2007 
 
Total 
number 
of NUTS 
2 
regions 
Number of 
NUTS 2 
regions with 
GDP below 
75% of the 
EU average 
in PPP 
Number of 
NUTS 2 regions 
where the 
unemployment 
rate is above 
the EU average 
Number of 
NUTS 2 
regions 
where the 
employment 
rate is 
below the 
EU average 
Number of 
NUTS 2 
regions with 
population 
density below 
30 per km2 
Austria 9 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 11 0 5 9 0 
Bulgaria 6 6 3 5 0 
Cyprus 1 0 0 0 0 
Czech Rep. 8 7 2 2 0 
Denmark 5 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 1 1 0 0 0 
Finland 5 0 2 1 4 
France 25 4 15 21 0 
Germany 39 0 18 12 0 
Greece 13 6 10 13 0 
Hungary 7 6 4 7 0 
Ireland 2 0 0 0 0 
Italy 21 5 6 20 0 
Latvia 1 1 1 0 0 
Lithuania 1 1 0 1 0 
Luxembourg 1 0 0 1 0 
Malta 1 0 0 1 0 
Netherlands 12 0 0 0 0 
Poland 15 15 7 15 0 
Portugal 7 4 3 1 1 
Romania 8 7 2 7 0 
Slovakia 4 3 3 2 0 
Slovenia 2 1 0 0 0 
Spain 18 1 17 12 0 
Sweden 8 0 2 0 4 
UK 37 0 7 4 0 
Norway 7 0 0 0 6 
Note: Data for population density in Norway are from 2006. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Unemployment data do not show such a clear divide between northern, central and 
southern Europe, as a majority of regions in a number of countries (Bulgaria, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Spain) in different parts of Europe have unemployment 
rates that are above the EU average. Where high unemployment rates are associated with 
low levels of GDP per capita and low economic growth rates, there are likely to be 
weaknesses in labour demand. However, in regions with high unemployment rates despite 
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high levels of GDP per capita, labour market institutions related, for example, to job-
matching may function poorly. 
The final indicator shown provides a different view of vulnerability. In terms of population 
density, only four countries (Finland, Portugal, Sweden, Norway) have any regions with 
fewer than 30 inhabitants per square kilometre. Although such regions may have high levels 
of GDP per capita and employment, there are often particular needs for public intervention 
to facilitate market access for firms and to ensure the viability of public services. 
In some countries, structurally weaker regions have been particularly affected by the crisis. 
This is the case in a number of central European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia); the recession is also affecting some manufacturing 
regions in these countries but the impact is more muted in metropolitan regions. In Poland, 
for example, there have been above-average increases in unemployment rates in a number 
of the structurally weaker eastern regions (Malopolskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, 
Warminsko-Mazurskie), and in some south-western manufacturing regions, but only limited 
effects in metropolitan regions (e.g. Mazowieckie and Lodzkie).45 Similarly, increases in 
unemployment rates have been significant in eastern regions in the Czech Republic 
(Moravskoslezský, Olomoucký and Zlínský regions), Hungary (North-East, Észak-Alföld) and 
Slovakia (Banská Bystrica, Preov), but much lower in metropolitan regions (Prague region 
and the Central Bohemian region surrounding Prague; the Budapest region and Southern 
Transdanubia; and Bratislava and Trnava). 
The impact on structurally weaker regions is also evident in wealthier countries. In Finland, 
for example, the highest increase in unemployment rates is in Eastern Finland, which 
already had the highest unemployment rate and lowest level of GDP per capita before the 
crisis, and has in recent months seen significant job cuts, for example in the forestry and 
paper sectors. In the UK, above-average increases in unemployment have been seen in the 
structurally weaker regions of Northern Ireland, Scotland, South West England and Wales, 
whereas the lowest rates of increase are in south-eastern England (East Midlands, East of 
England, South East and London). Structurally weaker regions in north-eastern France have 
high levels of industrial employment, and have thus been strongly affected by the downturn 
in international demand (Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Lorraine, Picardie, Champagne-Ardenne, 
Franche-Comté, Haute-Normandie). Some regions in southern Italy (e.g. Puglia) have also 
seen a significant rise in unemployment rates, due to falling demand in export sectors such 
as textiles, shoes and furniture, although in some southern regions, job losses seem to be 
leading to higher inactivity rates rather than always to higher unemployment rates. In 
addition, even though the use of temporary contracts is more prevalent in southern Italy 
than in the Centre-North, job losses here are affecting permanent employees as well as 
temporary workers, whereas it is mainly temporary workers that are becoming unemployed 
in the Centre-North.46 
                                                 
45 Gorzelak (2009) Op. Cit . 
46 Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro (CNEL) (2009) Rapport o sul  mercat o del lavoro 2008-
2009, Roma pp.140-146. 
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In a number of countries (Finland, Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden), there are concerns 
over the longer term effects of the crisis on structurally weaker regions. The loss of even 
relatively small numbers of firms and jobs in such regions could have significant effects, 
particularly if these losses lead to reduced demand for goods and services from other local 
firms. In some countries (e.g. Finland, Germany, Sweden), these structurally weaker 
regions are in any case characterised by demographic decline, especially the out-migration 
of more educated, younger people, and this trend could be further fuelled by the recession.  
There are also concerns over the impact of the recession on private investment in such 
regions. In Germany, private sector decisions to postpone or cancel investment projects are 
seen as likely to have a stronger effect in the new Länder, where such projects are more 
likely to be integrated into broader development strategies.47 In Poland, eastern regions 
(notably Podlaskie, Warmiĝsko-mazurskie and Ħwiētokrzyskie) are less attractive to business 
investors and could also be affected by the impact of the crisis on neighbouring Ukraine, 
not least because difficulties in the Ukraine are leading to questions over the Euro 2012 
football tournament, with potentially negative effects on private investment in both the 
Ukraine and in Polands eastern regions.48  
Further issues relate to existing or future public spending cuts that are rooted in the need 
to reduce public sector indebtedness generated by the financial crisis and economic 
recession. On the one hand, regional and local authorities in structurally weaker regions in 
all countries tend to have weaker public finances, and are thus more likely to be affected 
by any reductions in central government compensation for such weakness. On the other 
hand, levels of public sector employment are often higher in structurally weaker regions, so 
that the impact of any future cuts in public employment could also have a stronger impact 
in such regions. 
5.3 The degree of regional sectoral specialisation 
A further dimension that is shaping the impact of the crisis on specific regions is their 
sectoral structure. In general, a regions vulnerability to adverse economic shocks is seen to 
be correlated with its sectoral specialisation, although the degree of regional specialisation 
has decreased in Europe since the 1950s, not least due to the expansion of public and some 
private services in all regions.49 
In 2008-09, some sectors have been directly affected by the first stages of the downturn, 
notably financial services, export-oriented manufacturing and the construction industry, 
while other sectors have mainly experienced second-wave falls in demand. Regions which 
specialise in a narrow range of sectors are particularly vulnerable to sectoral shocks; a key 
                                                 
47 M. Rosenfeld (2009) Op. Cit . 
48 Rzeczpospolita (2009) Kryzys bi j e w biedne regiony, 13 March. 
49 W. Molle (1996) The regional economic structure of the European Union: an analysis of long-term 
developments, in: K. Peschel (ed.) Regional Growt h and Regional Pol icy wit hin t he Framework of  
European Int egrat ion, Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag: Heidelberg, pp.66-86. M. Hallet (2000) Regional 
specialisation and concentration in the EU, Economic Papers 141, Brussels: DG Economic and Financial 
Affairs. K. Aiginger and W. Leitner (2002) Regional concentration in the USA and Europe: who follows 
whom? Welt wirt schaf t l iches Archiv 138: 1-28. 
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concern in such regions is that the recession could permanently reduce the number of firms 
and jobs in core sectors, leading to a structurally lower level of output and employment 
even after the downturn has passed. 
Table 12 provides a condensed overview of the extent of regional sectoral specialisation in 
EU Member States and Norway. It shows the percentage of national employment in four 
large sectors (Industry, Construction, Financial and business services, and Public services), 
as well as the dispersion of regional unemployment rates (calculated in terms of 
coefficients of variation). 
There is a relatively strong degree of regional specialisation in the industrial sector in all 
countries but specialisation is particularly strong in Portugal (due to very low levels of 
industrial employment in the Algarve and Madeira, and high levels in Norte). Regional 
specialisation in industry is also relatively high in Finland (largely due to low levels of 
industrial employment in Åland and high levels in Western Finland); in Italy (with 
particularly low levels in Lazio, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna but also Liguria and Valle 
dAosta, and high levels in Marche, Veneto and Lombardia);and in Spain (with low levels of 
industrial employment in the Canarias, Illes Balears, Extremadura and Madrid, and high 
levels in Navarra, Pais Vasco and La Rioja). 
In general, levels of regional specialisation in the construction sector are lower than for 
industry, with particularly low levels in Finland, the Czech Republic, Sweden and Norway, 
indicating that there is little difference in the extent of construction activity across the 
regions. In some countries, however, there is a degree of regional specialisation, especially 
in Belgium, Germany, Portugal and Italy. In Germany, for example, construction sector 
employment rates are particularly high in several regions in the new Länder, not least in 
the two Brandenburg regions surrounding Berlin and in other urban regions (Chemnitz, 
Thüringen, Leipzig) and is low in a number of western regions, often in metropolitan areas 
(e.g. Hamburg, Bremen, Köln). In Italy, the geographical pattern is unclear, with high rates 
in both northern and southern regions (Valle dAosta, Basilicata) and low rates in northern 
and central regions (Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Marche, Piemonte). 
Employment in financial and other business service sectors is quite concentrated in most 
countries, notably in the Czech Republic and Portugal (but also e.g. in Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden), with employment rates, as might be expected, particularly high in capital 
city regions. Specialisation is relatively low in Italy, with fairly robust employment in all 
regions but higher rates of employment not only in the capital city region (Lazio) but also in 
the northern region of Lombardia. In general, employment rates in this sector are higher in 
central and northern Italy than in southern regions. 
Lastly, the degree of concentration in the public service sector is low in all countries, due 
to employment in all regions in sub-national government and sectors such as education and 
healthcare. Dispersion is slightly higher in Belgium, Italy and Portugal, where public 
employment rates are higher, both in capital city regions and in some structurally weaker 
regions (Luxembourg and Namur in Belgium; Sicilia, Sardegna and Campania in Italy; and 
the Azores region in Portugal). 
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Table 12: Sectoral specialisation in employment at the level of NUTS 2 regions, 2006 
Industry 
(NACE sectors C to E) 
Construction 
(NACE sector F) 
Financial and other business 
services (NACE sectors J and K) 
Public services  
(NACE sectors L to P) 
 
Percentage of 
national 
employment 
Regional 
dispersion 
(coefficient of 
variation) 
Percentage of 
national 
employment 
Regional 
dispersion 
(coefficient 
of variation) 
Percentage of 
national 
employment 
Regional 
dispersion 
(coefficient of 
variation) 
Percentage 
of national 
employment 
Regional 
dispersion 
(coefficient 
of variation) 
Austria 16.9 0.28 6.6 0.13 14.8 0.33 27.3 0.11 
Belgium 14.6 0.31 5.8 0.27 19.3 0.28 34.1 0.16 
Czech Rep. 29.6 0.28 8.6 0.06 12.3 0.56 20.9 0.06 
Denmark 14.1 0.27 6.5 0.22 15.2 0.36 35.5 0.07 
Finland 18.8 0.35 7.0 0.04 12.6 0.33 33.7 0.09 
France 15.4 0.27 6.5 0.14 15.7 0.26 34.9 0.06 
Germany 20.0 0.27 5.5 0.26 16.9 0.26 30.4 0.11 
Italy 20.9 0.37 7.6 0.24 14.5 0.16 28.5 0.16 
Netherlands 13.3 0.26 7.0 0.15 21.2 0.24 30.3 0.08 
Portugal 18.5 0.52 10.2 0.26 8.0 0.50 24.1 0.19 
Spain 16.2 0.37 12.8 0.14 11.2 0.27 27.3 0.09 
Sweden 17.0 0.26 5.8 0.09 14.8 0.37 38.8 0.09 
UK 11.4 0.26 4.7 0.20 n/a n/a 32.1 0.09 
Norway 13.6 0.34 6.7 0.09 13.4 0.39 37.5 0.12 
Notes: Data exclude the overseas departments in France, as well as Ceuta y Melilla in Spain. Data for UK are from March 2007. Regional data were not available for 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia or Slovenia. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data and, for UK, on Office for National Statistics (2009) Labour Market  St at ist ics, August 2009
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5.4 The regional effects of sectoral shocks 
This section examines the extent to which regional sectoral specialisation can explain the 
varied impact of the crisis and recession on regional economic development. It examines 
the extent to which sectoral aspects of the crisis also have a regional dimension.  
5.4.1 Export-oriented industries 
Some of the most evident regional impacts of the crisis are rooted in the geographical 
concentration of export-oriented industrial firms which have suffered due to the fall in 
international demand (e.g. in Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, UK). In some countries, these regions are 
among the most dynamic in economic terms (such as Kärnten, Steiermark and Vorarlberg in 
Austria, or the Länder of Baden-Württemberg, Bayern and Rheinland-Pfalz in Germany). 
Similarly in Sweden, the main regions affected have above-average levels of manufacturing 
employment, and are either located in the west (Värmland, Västra Götaland) where there 
are many automotive sector manufacturers, or in the south east (Blekinge, Jönköping, 
Kronoberg, Kalmar) or mid east (Södermanland, Västmanland), where there are many 
export-oriented manufacturing SME subcontractors which have been strongly hit by the 
downturn. In Poland, some of the strongest increases in unemployment rates are seen in 
south western manufacturing regions (especially Lubuskie but also Dolnoslaskie, Opolskie, 
Wielkopolskie). Dynamic manufacturing regions are also among those most affected by 
higher unemployment in the Czech Republic (Liberecký, Karlovarský and VysoĆina regions), 
Hungary (Central and Western Transdanubia) and Slovakia (TrenĆín region). 
In other countries, export-oriented manufacturers are mainly located in areas affected by 
the restructuring of heavy industries in the 1970s and 1980s (France), or are located 
throughout the country in both core and peripheral regions (Finland, Netherlands, Norway). 
In some countries, such as Italy, the regional impact of the downturn in exports is complex. 
For example, it was initially expected that, as in past exogenous crises, the crisis would 
mainly affect Italys more dynamic, export-oriented Centre-North regions, yet in fact the 
South saw stronger falls in employment and demand in the second half of 2008 and the first 
quarter of 2009.50 One explanation may be that, when firms in the Centre-North 
experienced a fall in foreign demand in autumn 2008, they quickly cut demand for labour 
and inputs, thus transmitting the effects of the crisis to firms in the South.51  
The manufacturing sector most evidently affected by the crisis in a number of countries is 
the automotive sector, as consumer and business demand has fallen strongly in the face of 
economic uncertainty, as well as constraints on credit. Regions particularly badly affected 
include western Sweden (Västra Götaland), some towns on the west coast of Norway, south-
east Netherlands, the West Midlands and Yorkshire & the Humber in the UK, regions such as 
Wielkopolskie in Poland, various French regions, and a number of German Länder 
(especially Baden-Württemberg and Bayern but also Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen 
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and Rheinland-Pfalz, as well as Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen). The scale of 
impact is illustrated by the case of France, which is the second biggest car producer in 
Europe after Germany, employing 300,000 people directly and a further 400,000 people in 
supply and service sectors.52 Employment is concentrated in the north, notably Nord-Pas de 
Calais, Ile-de-France and Franche-Comté, but is also spread across other regions, including 
further south. There have been extensive job losses since October 2008,53 particularly 
among component manufacturers (Nord-Pas de Calais, Rhône-Alpes and Haute-
Normandie),54 as well as in large manufacturers, notably Renault and Peugeot (4900 and 
3500 voluntary redundancies respectively).  
The impact of the recession on other industrial sectors has also had significant regional 
effects. In Finland, eastern and central regions have been particularly affected by the 
downturn in the forestry sector, which accounts for around one fifth of Finlands exports 
and was already facing challenges before the crisis, notably higher input costs (e.g. energy, 
labour and raw materials), international overcapacity, a strong currency relative to the US 
dollar, and wood tariffs imposed by Russia. In Poland, the furniture industry in northern 
regions is experiencing difficulties, as are electronics and electrical manufacturers in a 
number of cities, for example in Wielkopolskie. In Ireland, both core and peripheral regions 
have seen the loss of significant numbers of manufacturing jobs, as multi-national firms, for 
example in electronics sectors, have shifted production to central Europe and Asia. 
Despite the impact of the fall in global demand on many manufacturers, businesses in some 
sectors and regions are less negatively affected. In both Norway and Sweden, the fall in the 
exchange rate relative to the Euro has provided a better competitive basis for certain 
exporters. In Sweden, this has, for example, benefited the forestry and paper sectors which 
are largely concentrated in central and in some northern areas, as well as some automotive 
sectors in western regions (notably truck production which, unlike the passenger car sector, 
is not affected by global overcapacity). In Norway, important sectors, such as the 
shipbuilding and maritime industries, have been protected by long-term contracts, thus 
benefiting many coastal areas, while recent increases in the oil price has stimulated oil 
exploration, with knock-on benefits for regions specialising in oil and gas production, 
engineering and shipbuilding. Similarly, although old industrial regions in Poland (such as 
âódıkie and ĦlĎskie) are experiencing a reduction in international demand for 
manufactured goods, they are also seeing the emergence of new opportunities in a climate 
where many international firms are seeking to cut costs. Some Polish locations enjoy a 
combination of relatively low production and labour costs with good accessibility and 
workforce skills. For instance, the computer manufacturer Dell announced in early 2009 
that it was moving production from Ireland to the Special Economic Zone in âódı.  
                                                 
52 http://www.invest-in-france.org/international/en/automotive-sector.html 
53 Les Echos (2008) La crise at t eint  les équipement iers aut omobiles dans les régions, 30 October. 
54 Les Echos (2008) Les suppressions d’ emplois en France, 28 October. 
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5.4.2 Construction 
The construction sector has been particularly affected in a number of countries, with the 
impacts often most strongly felt in urban areas, particularly larger cities where housing 
market demand has been particularly strong in recent years (Finland, Poland, UK). In 
Poland, constraints on bank lending to households, as well as the zlotys depreciation, have 
reduced demand for housing, so that many residential developments in large cities such as 
Poznaĝ, âódı, Warsaw and Kraków have either been suspended or postponed. Similarly, in 
the UK, the housing bubble was particularly inflated in London and the South East of 
England before the recession, and the effects of the bubbles bursting are also most evident 
here. 
In contrast, the effects of the slump in Irelands housing market are greatest in the less 
prosperous Border, Midland and West regions, at least in terms of job losses.55 The number 
of jobs cut in the construction sector is highest in absolute terms in these regions and the 
impact of this fall in employment is also more serious due to the limited availability of 
other employment opportunities in manufacturing and service sectors in these regions. 
5.4.3 Financial sector 
Although the current recession is rooted in a crisis in the financial sector, some countries 
have not seen any significant bank restructuring or job losses (e.g. Austria, Finland, Italy, 
Norway, Poland, Sweden) and, even where such effects have been experienced, their 
broader economic impact depends on the size of the financial sector within the overall 
economy (with the industry accounting for a large share of employment in Luxembourg, 
Cyprus and Ireland, as well as the UK and Belgium).  
As financial service sectors are usually located in a small number of agglomerations, the 
direct effects of the crisis on this sector are often regionally concentrated (France, 
Netherlands, UK). However, even in the concentrated financial sector of the UK, job losses 
are not only seen in London and South East England but also in other regions in northern 
England and Scotland. In some countries, such as Germany, the financial sector is less 
concentrated and there are a number of regional commercial and public banks, some of 
which have been strongly affected by the crisis, for example in Dresden, Düsseldorf, 
Frankfurt-am-Main, Hamburg, Kiel, München and Wiesbaden. 
The crisis in the financial sector could potentially have wider effects. However, in most 
countries, there is little evidence that constraints on bank lending to businesses and 
households is affecting regions differently, even in countries such as Germany with more 
regionally structured banking systems. In Italy, however, there are concerns that the fall in 
bank lending is particularly affecting structurally weaker regions in the South, where firms 
are less capitalised and are typically characterised by shorter term borrowing.56  
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Further regional effects could be seen in the medium- to longer-term, particularly through 
the impact of the financial sector on the finances of regional and local authorities. In 
Germany, a number of Land governments (e.g. Bayern, Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein) 
have contributed to the rescue packages of banks and they will therefore have to absorb 
these costs into their budgets. In addition, some local authorities in Germany have been 
involved in cross-border leasing agreements with US investors (e.g. for funding urban 
transport systems or hospitals), many of whom are now pulling out, and this could 
potentially generate additional costs for these local authorities.57 Moreover, if the crisis 
leads to stricter bank lending criteria, this could particularly affect local authorities with 
significant existing debt, which are generally in structurally weaker regions.58  
5.4.4 Externally-oriented service sectors 
Some regions with strengths in private sector services have also been affected by the fall in 
international demand. In some service sectors, demand is strongly linked to broader 
business activity and the volume of international trade. In the Netherlands, for example, a 
number of regions have strengths in trade and logistics and have seen a fall in demand due 
to the downturn in the volume of international goods trade, as well as passenger transport. 
The impact has been strongest in the area around Amsterdam Schiphol airport, as well as 
Rotterdam harbour, both of which have seen significant reductions in traffic as a result of 
the crisis.59 However, other Dutch regions also have strengths in logistics (the South West) 
or the road haulage and transport sector (South East).60  
Tourism is another important externally-oriented service sector which is often 
geographically concentrated, sometimes in regions with few other business activities. The 
impact of the crisis on individual regions is unclear, especially as figures on the results of 
the important summer season are still sparse. However, there is evidence of particularly 
strong increases in unemployment rates in some tourism-oriented Mediterranean regions in 
Greece and Spain. Similarly, the number of international arrivals in European countries was 
around ten percent lower in the second quarter of 2009 than in 2008.61 In some countries 
(e.g. Netherlands, Norway), there are concerns over the potential effects of reduced 
tourism numbers, not least on the economies of structurally weaker, peripheral areas. In 
other countries, there were hopes that regions could benefit if people decided to take 
holidays closer to home rather than travelling abroad. In Austria, for example, tourism 
accounts for over 8 percent of GDP and 12 percent of employment62 (and considerably 
higher in regions such as the Tyrol) and there was seen to be potential to benefit from the 
crisis, particularly if Austrian and German tourists decided to spend their holidays closer to 
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home. Countries which have seen exchange rate depreciations may also have attracted 
more tourists, including Sweden, where tourism is of particular importance in northern 
regions. 
5.4.5 Public sector 
In many regions, public employment has cushioned the effects of the crisis in 2008-09, 
although not in countries which are already introducing public spending cuts (e.g. Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania). The capacity of the public sector 
to mute the short-term effects of the recession depends in part on the scale of this sector 
in the overall economy, as well as the geographical distribution of employment (see Table 
12). Regions with relatively large public sectors are often structurally weaker areas where 
public services (such as health and education) play a particularly important role in 
employment because private sector jobs in such regions are generally poorly paid or 
precarious. However, public sector employment is also of importance in capital city regions 
and other large administrative centres, which are not only home to core State functions but 
also, for example, large research and education facilities.  
In the medium- to long-term, many countries are likely to introduce public spending cuts in 
order to reduce the high levels of indebtedness currently being incurred via fiscal stimulus 
packages. The impact of such cuts is likely to be greater in regions with high levels of 
public employment, particularly if they affect health, education and social welfare bodies, 
as well as sub-national authorities, rather than simply central State ministries. In the UK, 
one report forecasts that public sector employment could shrink by 240,000 to 290,000 jobs 
between 2009 and 2014, with particular cities in northern England, Wales and Scotland, but 
also some southern English cities, seen as likely to be most affected.63 
There are particular concerns over the potential impact of future spending cuts on the 
ability of local authorities in structurally weaker regions to provide adequate public 
services (Finland, Germany, Sweden). In Germany, for example, local authorities finances 
typically deteriorate in recession, as they are responsible for paying the housing and 
heating costs of people on unemployment benefits but also see a fall in corporate and 
income tax revenues. In the short term, fiscally weaker local authorities may be less 
affected, as they receive compensation from Land authorities for structural shortfalls in 
their own tax base. In the medium term, however, poorer Land governments, particularly 
many of the new Länder, may be unable to maintain levels of transfers to local authorities, 
due to broader efforts to reduce public indebtedness. 
6. REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
6.1 Different kinds of regional intervention 
The primary focus of all governments response to the crisis has been national and 
international, rather than regional. This is not only the case for measures for the financial 
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sector or monetary policy, but also most fiscal interventions, many of which are unlikely to 
have significantly different effects across regions. These include, for example, changes in 
personal income tax and business tax; the provision of additional business lending; and 
additional funding for local infrastructure in all local authorities. 
Nevertheless, most countries have incorporated some kind of geographical dimension into 
their fiscal responses to the crisis. In some countries, elements of the fiscal stimulus 
packages are channelled through regional policy instruments. In many more, some fiscal 
measures explicitly target regions or localities, although funding does not flow through 
regional policy. In addition, certain fiscal measures may implicitly be biased towards 
certain regions because they focus on sectors or activities that are more prevalent in some 
regions than in others. Lastly, the stimulus packages in some countries include 
organisational changes, aimed at improving the monitoring of regional economies or at 
involving sub-national authorities in the policy response. 
6.2 Changes in regional policy 
6.2.1 Addit ional regional policy support  for weaker regions 
Governmental authorities in some countries argue that the recession should not be allowed 
to stimulate shifts in regional policy because it is a long-term structural policy which should 
not be used to address cyclical problems (Austria, Netherlands). However, changes have 
been made to regional policy in a number of countries, with additional support being 
channelled to structurally weaker regions. The scale of new measures varies, however, with 
only Germany using existing regional policy instruments as a core component of central 
State fiscal stimulus packages. In other countries, changes are more limited, and take the 
form of small rises in funding allocations or shifts in eligibility requirements. 
In Germany, regional policy is centrally involved in the federal governments response to 
the crisis, with the allocation of an additional 0.2 billion to the Regional GA (Joint Task for 
the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures, Gemeinschaf t saufgabe 'Verbesserung 
der regionalen Wirt schaf t sst rukt ur’ ) in 2009-11. This funding is earmarked for existing 
designated structurally weaker areas but, unlike mainstream Regional GA funding (where 
the new Länder receive 6/7ths of resources), the additional funds are divided 50:50 
between the old and new Länder. This funding division was introduced with a view to 
ensuring the rapid absorption of funds and the availability of co-financing at Land and local 
authority levels. In addition, the GA is one of the instruments which implements the federal 
governments regulation on small-scale aid (Bundesregelung Kleinbeihi l fen) (under the EUs 
Temporary Framework for State aid measures in the financial and economic crisis). Under 
this regulation, the Regional GAs aid ceiling for large firms in designated areas of the old 
Länder in 2009-10 has been raised to 0.5 million (instead of the usual aid ceiling of 0.2 
million). The new Länder do not benefit from this change as they are fully covered by 
Article 87(3)(a) and so already enjoyed higher aid ceilings before these changes. 
In many countries, the crisis has only stimulated minor changes in regional policy. This 
approach is seen in Norway, for example, where a regional policy White Paper for the next 
four years was published in April 2009 and shows no significant shift in strategic direction 
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due to the economic crisis.64 Nevertheless, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development has allocated additional funding for sectors and areas facing economic 
problems. Similarly, in Sweden, no major changes have been introduced to regional policy 
expenditure or strategies but funding for regional transport aid has been increased by two 
percent in 2009, in order to compensate firms in the four northernmost regions for the 
transport costs associated with higher oil prices. Moreover, as the crisis is leading to 
changes in the pattern of demand for different types of support, the Swedish government 
has decided to amend eligibility requirements, so that funding can now be allocated for 
business training alone, and not only when training is linked to business investment 
projects. Minor changes in eligibility requirements have also been made to the main 
regional incentive scheme in France (the prime d’ amènagement  du t erri t oire, PAT), 
notably in the case of extension or takeover projects.  
6.2.2 Re-orientat ion of regional policy 
In other countries, some of the changes introduced to regional policy do not benefit 
structurally weaker regions but instead either benefit relatively wealthier regions or all 
regions. Some of these changes are being generated in a bottom-up way, as regional actors 
endeavour to respond to the recession, but others are being imposed by central authorities. 
In Denmark, for example, the regional growth fora, which have the task of monitoring and 
furthering economic development in the regions, have reacted to the crisis by establishing 
or extending support for venture or loan capital. In addition, some are increasing their 
focus on allocating grants to SMEs on small no-bridge islands. In the Netherlands, no 
changes have been made in regional policy funding or strategic goals but regional actors 
have introduced some revisions to individual Peaks in t he Delt a programmes. Similarly, in 
Finland, the level and geographical distribution of domestic central State funding for 
regional authorities is unchanged but it is being more strongly focused on creating 
businesses and jobs and on preventing unemployment.  
In contrast, top-down changes have been made to regional aid schemes in England (the 
Grant for Business Investment) and Scotland (Regional Selective Assistance) in response to 
the downturn. In both cases, the lowest designation category (Tier 3), which provides 
grants to SMEs outside Article 87(3) areas, has been extended to cover the whole territory, 
and aid rates have been raised to 10 percent (from 7.5 percent) for medium-sized 
companies and to 20 percent (from 15 percent) for small companies. In addition, the 
previous aid ceiling of £0.1 billion per firm has been lifted. As there has been no significant 
increase in total funding for regional aid, the overall effect is likely to be that some of the 
funding previously earmarked for structurally weaker areas will now flow to wealthier 
areas. 
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6.2.3 Reduced funding for regional policy 
In some countries, efforts to raise resources to respond to the crisis have led governments 
to cut certain categories of spending, including for some regional policy instruments. 
Similar fiscal pressures are likely to emerge in other countries in coming years, possibly 
leading to further cuts in regional policy. 
In Italy, the fiscal stimulus package includes a reduction in domestic regional policy 
funding, with resources being reallocated to other types of expenditure. In March 2009, 
around 18 billion (of a total of circa 63 billion in 2007-13) was cut from the Fund for 
Under-utilised Areas (Fondo Aree Sot t out i l izzat e, FAS), which finances economic 
development in the regions and focuses in particular on the South (for which 85 percent of 
FAS resources are reserved).65 Although the regional programmes funded by the FAS are 
relatively untouched, the national component of FAS funding for regional development has 
effectively been abolished, namely the national FAS programmes for Education, research 
and competitiveness, Networks and mobility, and Governance, technical assistance and 
systemic actions. These funding cuts are expected to have a particular impact on southern 
regions which are not covered by Cohesion policys Convergence Objective (Abruzzo, Molise 
and Sardegna) which receive much more limited support from Cohesion policy. The 
government has reallocated the resources cut from the FAS to three special national funds, 
one focused on employment and training, a second on infrastructure, and a third on the 
real economy in general. 
Regional policy funds have also been cut in England. The central States fiscal stimulus 
package is partly financed by a reduction of £34 million in the Regional Development 
Agencies (RDA) budgets for 2008-09 and further cuts may be seen. These reductions follow 
earlier cuts in 2007 of 2.5 percent plus further efficiency savings, as well as a reduction in 
September 2008 of one percent for 2009-10 and 10 percent for 2010-11. However, the fiscal 
stimulus package also channels some additional funding through the RDA budgets, notably 
for small firms and for low-carbon businesses. Overall, it is likely that the fiscal stimulus 
package will mean that the RDAs focus more strongly on core activities, such as business 
support schemes, innovation centres and physical regeneration schemes, rather than social 
or community projects.  
6.2.4 Organisational changes in regional policy 
In a number of countries, the crisis has stimulated efforts to ensure effective cooperation 
and coordination between different actors in the field of regional policy. In general, the 
aim has been to mobilise all available resources and information, in order to increase the 
effectiveness of policy responses to local and regional difficulties, particularly in locations 
most affected by firm closures or restructuring and by job losses. 
In Finland, this approach is seen to be based on lessons drawn from the 1990s recession, 
when policy responses relied on cooperation between central, regional and local 
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government and the creation of tailored solutions.66 In the current crisis, the networking of 
regional actors is being extended. The central government has maintained a relatively 
strong role during the downturn, but at the same time has promoted more dialogue with 
the Regional Councils. Coordination has also improved among regional and local authorities.  
In Sweden, regional coordinators have been appointed in 2008 and 2009, first in northern 
regions affected by the closure of saw mills, then in western automotive regions, and 
finally in all regions as the crisis spread across the country. Each region now has two 
coordinators (the county governor and the chair of the regional executive committee), who 
are responsible for reporting to central government on local developments and needs, and 
for coordinating the efforts of various local and regional actors. In addition, the central 
government has appointed a group of State Secretaries to facilitate dialogue with the 
regional coordinators. This approach is seen to have improved cooperation at regional level, 
and also between the regions and the central level.  
A similar approach is being taken in France, where the regional and departmental préfet s 
have the task of monitoring the crisis in the regions and of reporting back to central 
government on sectors affected and on support measures needed. This approach has been 
intensified in ten regions which are perceived to be most affected by the crisis, namely 
Bretagne, Champagne-Ardenne, Franche-Comté, Haute-Normandie, Lorraine, Midi-
Pyrénées, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Picardie, Poitou-Charentes, Rhône-Alpes. In each of these 
regions, a commissaire à la réindust rial isat ion (reindustrialisation commissioner) has been 
appointed to work alongside the regional préfet  in coordinating the various policy 
instruments available.  
In the UK, the government established a National Economic Council in October 2008 to 
coordinate the governments response to the crisis, as well as a Regional Economic Council 
(REC) made up of central State Ministers and representatives from the Regional 
Development Agencies, local authorities, businesses and trade unions. The REC meets on a 
quarterly basis to decide how regions should individually and collectively respond to 
economic pressures, and it also provides feedback on the economic situation of the regions 
to the National Economic Council. 
6.2.5 The role of Cohesion policy 
The reaction of Member States to the changes introduced by the Commission to rules 
governing Cohesion policy in response to the crisis (see Section 4.4) has been mixed.67 Most 
managing authorities have broadly welcomed the Commissions interventions, although 
some note that the measures could generate implementation risks or raise questions over 
the longer-term goals of Cohesion policy. Other authorities argue that more could be done 
to simplify procedures, or that the measures are relatively unlikely to contribute 
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significantly to the countrys response to the crisis, not least due to low level of EU funding 
in some countries. 
Many managing authorities have taken advantage of the opportunity to extend the closure 
date of the 2000-06 period and of the increased EU advance payment for the 2007-13 
period (e.g. Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden), although some question the advisability of further prolonging the 2000-06 
programmes (e.g. Austria, UK). The extent to which other measures have been taken up 
varies across Member States and programmes depending, for example, on the types of 
intervention funded (e.g. whether there are major projects or financial engineering 
projects), as well as on the role of Cohesion policy interventions in relation to broader 
public expenditure strategies. 
Some Member States have responded positively to the opportunity to make thematic 
changes to the 2007-13 programmes, although others are making few or no revisions, 
generally because this is not seen to be necessary or appropriate (e.g. Austria, Germany, 
Netherlands, Poland). Significant revisions have been introduced, for example, in Hungary, 
where the government has had to delay tax cuts and reduce domestic public spending as a 
result of the crisis. The government and the European Commission have agreed to 
reallocate resources between the Hungarian Structural Funds programmes (as well as the 
Cohesion Fund), with an additional 0.4 billion being re-directed towards support for 
enterprise, especially SMEs, and financial instruments. A number of other Member States 
have introduced more limited changes, for example in order to expand funding for business 
credit (in Italys Piemonte and Toscana), or to fund the introduction of short-time working 
measures (in UKs Wales). In Germany, one Land was considering using Structural Funds 
resources to provide rescue aid to firms in difficulty due to the crisis, but the European 
Commission advised that this was not an appropriate use of programme funds.  
There have also been varied reactions to the Commissions proposal that eligibility criteria 
be extended to allow ERDF funding to be allocated for energy efficient housing, not only in 
urban areas in the new Member States but in all areas affected by social exclusion in all 
Member States. Some programmes have not taken up this option, either because it is not 
seen as an appropriate use of Cohesion policy funds or because there is already domestic 
funding for such interventions (Denmark, Germany, Netherlands). In others, managing 
authorities are either pursuing this option actively (Greece, some UK programmes) or have 
some interest in adjusting programmes in this direction in future (Czech Republic, France, 
Greece, Slovenia). 
6.3 Other policy responses that target regions 
In addition to changes introduced in the context of explicit regional policy, some countries 
are channelling other types of funding to specific regions or localities in the recession. 
Resources may be targeted on structurally weaker regions, on stronger regions or on all 
regions. However, as in the case of explicit regional policy, there are also situations where 
funding for broader regional interventions is being reduced. 
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6.3.1 Addit ional support  for weaker regions 
Some countries are allocating additional funding to local areas which are structurally 
weaker and so have particular difficulties in responding to the crisis. In Germany, for 
example, the federal government has earmarked 3 billion in 2009-10 for loans to 
structurally weak local authorities, primarily those in the two highest categories of 
designated area under the Regional GA. These loans can be up to 100 percent of costs, are 
interest-free for two years and enjoy a subsidised interest rate in the following two years.  
In other countries, resources are being targeted on locations where firms are particularly 
badly affected by the crisis. In Finland, the governments recovery package includes 
measures to provide assistance to specific areas facing the sudden closure of plants or 
businesses. Eleven areas throughout the country have been identified as suffering from 
rapid structural change, mainly where major forestry plants have ceased operations during 
the downturn. These measures involve national, regional and local levels, as well as the 
businesses concerned, which are expected to support workers facing redundancy and to 
help fund alternative employment. The funding will help over 4000 people who have lost 
their jobs in the affected areas. Similarly, in Ireland, a task force has been set up to 
coordinate and report on action needed to assist recovery in the area of Limerick; however, 
due to fiscal constraints, no additional funds have been allocated to the task force. 
In France, the main measures that focus directly on the worst-affected localities had 
already been agreed in principle before the crisis. First, the National Territorial Renewal 
Fund was set up in February 2008 but was not assigned funding (of 150 million) until 2009. 
The Fund provides non-guaranteed loans to firms which create between 10 and 500 new 
jobs in (to date) 17 areas affected by industrial restructuring and which are not eligible for 
other restructuring support such as regional aid. Second, under the EU Temporary State aid 
Framework, the ceiling on the tax exemption for firms in employment zones undergoing 
industrial restructuring has been raised from 0.2 to 0.5 billion. The tax exemption relates 
to a local business tax (t axe professionnel le) and benefits 67 of the 350 employment zones 
nationwide. Similar aid is available to 20 existing priority labour market areas, which are 
characterised by above-average unemployment and slow employment growth and are 
concentrated in northern regions.  
6.3.2 Re-orientat ion of regional focus 
Other measures taken to accelerate public and private investment may also have explicit 
regional dimensions. Some benefit stronger regions, either via the allocation of additional 
funding or via the extension of eligibility in their favour. Other measures involve the 
allocation of new central government resources for all sub-national authorities, or the re-
orientation of local or regional authority budgets in response to the crisis. 
One of the measures that mainly benefits stronger regions is the temporary extension of 
area eligibility under Germanys federal Central Innovation Programme for SMEs (Zent rales 
Innovat ionsprogramms Mit t elst and, ZIM) from the new Länder to include all Länder, with 
firms with up to 1000 employees throughout Germany now enjoying funding eligibility. The 
federal government has allocated an additional 0.9 billion to the programme in 2009-10, 
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with 0.1 billion of this amount being ring-fenced for the new Länder. Similarly, in the 
Netherlands, the crisis packages bring forward funding under the existing Economic 
Structure Enhancing Fund (FES) which finances national priority projects, including 
resources for the existing strong regions programme. The acceleration of FES spending 
will assist four large projects which relate to the mainports in the Randstad (Schiphol 
airport and Rotterdam harbour); energy investment in Groningen in the North; the food 
sector in Wageningen in the East; and the R&D activities of Brainport Eindhoven in the 
South East. However, although these projects are focused on specific towns with existing 
economic strengths, they involve five out of the six Peaks in t he Delt a regions and are thus 
distributed fairly evenly throughout the country. 
Other measures involve additional central government funding for all sub-national 
authorities. In Germany, for example, federal funding of 10 billion has been awarded in 
the form of investment grants for all local authorities. The funding is allocated to the 
Länder, largely on a per capita basis but with a slight bias towards the new Länder. Each 
Land is then responsible for dividing the funding between their local authorities, and may 
decide to retain a percentage of funds for supra-local projects. Land or local authorities 
must provide 25 percent co-financing. Similarly in Finland, the deterioration in the finances 
of municipalities in 2009 has led the central government to include an additional 760 
million for municipalities in its budget proposal for 2010, partly through measures already 
decided (an increase in employers pension contributions and property tax rates) but also 
through the allocation of additional central State transfers, including funds for refurbishing 
schools, health centres and nurseries, and IT investment in service provision.68 In Spain, a 
key element of the central governments stimulus package is the Local Investment Fund 
(Fondo de Inversión Local) of 8 billion, which is allocating up to 70 percent of the costs of 
local infrastructure works to municipalities. 
In some cases, such funding may have uneven geographical effects, depending on the 
capacity and desire of sub-national authorities to take up new resources. In France, the 
central government has amended existing rules on the reimbursement of VAT payments to 
sub-national authorities (regions, départ ements and communes). Funds are usually 
reimbursed two years in arrears but, in 2009, the central government will reimburse VAT 
payments for 2008 to any sub-national authority that commits to investing at least 1 more 
in 2009 than it did on average in 2004-2007. There has been strong take-up of this measure, 
with over 18,000 agreements reached by May 2009, amounting to an increase of 54 percent 
on 2004-2007 investment levels (or an additional 18.7 billion of investment). Most regions 
have opted to participate (except Lorraine, Champagne-Ardennes and Guadeloupe), as have 
all but six département s. However, fewer than half of the communes are participating, yet 
they account for over 40 percent of total investment. 
Lastly, regional or local authorities in a number of Member States (e.g. Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, UK) have produced their own plans for dealing with the effects of the 
crisis. In these cases, the scale of additional funding from the regional or local level varies, 
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as does the scope of different kinds of new interventions. Many authorities lack the funding 
and borrowing flexibility to be able to allocate significant resources to anti-crisis packages. 
In some cases (e.g. some German Länder), the packages mainly include central State 
funding which is channelled through sub-national authorities, or the re-orientation of 
existing instruments. In others (e.g. Poland), regional plans largely occur in the context of 
regional Structural Funds programmes. However, some sub-national authorities are 
allocating additional funding, for example in the Dutch province of Noord-Brabant where 
interventions are funded from the proceeds of energy privatisation. Similarly, the Scottish 
government is accelerating capital spending programmes at Scottish and local levels, 
reducing taxes on business, and allocating new funding for social housing. 
6.3.3 A reduction in public spending in the regions 
Where public expenditure cuts are already being introduced, these measures may have an 
explicit regional component. In Ireland, for example, the governments spending cuts 
include a number of measures that are likely to affect regional development. First, capital 
expenditure under the National Development Plan, which has a strong regional dimension, 
has been cut by around 20 percent in 2009; this will result, for example, in more limited 
funding for regional and local roads. Second, a significant public sector reorganisation is 
under consideration, that would involve the closure of the central government Department 
of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs; the closure of the Western Development 
Commission which currently supports the economic and social development of the western 
region; the transfer of business support functions from the regional development agency, 
Shannon Development, to national agencies; the merger of the regional offices of three 
national development agencies (Enterprise Ireland, IDA and FÁS); and a reduction in the 
number of local authorities by over one third. 
6.4 Policy responses that implicitly affect regional development 
A final category of measures introduced in the crisis packages do not directly target 
particular types of region or locality but may indirectly affect some locations more than 
others, even though interventions primarily aim to support national economic growth and 
employment. This is particularly the case for interventions targeted on sectors that are 
concentrated in specific regions. Similarly, funding for certain types of activity, such as 
R&D or transport infrastructure, may in practice be biased towards certain locations.  
Other indirect regional effects may be seen in the case of support for certain types of 
household if there are clear regional differences, for example in levels of personal 
disposable income or in property ownership rates. Where such regional disparities exist, 
grants and tax relief on household purchases are likely to benefit richer regions 
disproportionately, whereas welfare support and tax cuts for poorer households would more 
strongly benefit poorer regions. Nevertheless, many poorer (richer) households are also 
located in richer (poorer) regions; in particular, large cities often have higher levels of per 
capita personal disposable income but also large populations with very low disposable 
income levels. It is therefore difficult to establish the regional impact of measures targeted 
on households throughout an individual country. 
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6.4.1 Addit ional support  for specific sectors 
Most countries have introduced some measures which target particular sectors, notably 
financial services, automotives, construction and renewable energies. This support has a 
regional dimension in countries where these sectors are geographically concentrated. The 
characteristics of the regions where these industries are located vary between countries. 
All countries have introduced some form of support for the financial sector but the effects 
of many measures (e.g. systemic banking liquidity, or safeguards for private savers) should 
be felt throughout the economy. A region-specific effect is most likely to be seen where 
State intervention has directly aimed to reduce the scale of potential job losses by 
recapitalising or (partly/fully) nationalising certain banks. In some countries, such 
intervention has mainly safeguarded jobs in core agglomerations, as this is where the 
financial services sector is concentrated (e.g. Amsterdam, Ile-de-France and London). 
However, in Germany, employment in the financial sector is more geographically spread, 
and the headquarters of the main banks affected by the crisis are located in different parts 
of Germany, with HSH Nordbank based in Hamburg and Kiel, Hypo Real Estate and Bayern 
LB in München, Aareal in Wiesbaden, Commerzbank in Frankfurt-am-Main, the 
Industriekreditbank in Düsseldorf, and Sachsen LB in Dresden. 
Most countries have also introduced some support for the automotive sector, whether in 
the form of car scrappage schemes (Austria, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK) or other 
measures. These interventions will particularly benefit locations with many automotive 
manufacturing and supplier firms, such as northern France, the UKs West Midlands, South-
East Netherlands and western Sweden. In Germany, the car industry is relatively 
concentrated in southern Germany (Baden-Württemberg and Bayern) but also has a strong 
presence in other old Länder (e.g. Niedersachsen and Nordrhein-Westfalen, as well as 
Rheinland-Pfalz) and some new Länder (e.g. Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen). Although 
the impact of government measures is often greatest if households buy domestically-
produced cars, some regions may benefit from increased car imports. In the Netherlands, 
for example, it is anticipated that the car scrappage scheme should benefit the port of 
Rotterdam if it encourages increased flows of car imports and exports. 
In addition, a number of countries have introduced specific assistance for the renewable 
energies sector (Germany, Netherlands, Norway), which is often geographically 
concentrated. In the Netherlands, for example, extra funding for wind energy at sea and 
the acceleration of spending on sustainable energy may be of particular benefit to the 
North, which has clear strengths in these sectors. 
Other interventions are limited in EU countries due to strict EU rules on sectoral State aid. 
One exception, however, is the abolition of the passenger air transport tax in the 
Netherlands, which is likely to be of particular value to Schiphol airport and thus to the 
North Wing of the Randstad. In contrast, Norway has allocated support to other sectors, 
including the marine sector and the wood industry, which is likely to be of particular 
benefit to the west and north of the country. In addition, some horizontal schemes have 
earmarked support for individual sectors. The business guarantee programme includes both 
a general guarantee and a specific measure for the white fish industry, with implications 
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once more mainly for the west and north. Similarly, a new equity fund was launched in 
January 2009, with one quarter of its NOK 2 billion funding being earmarked for the marine 
sector. 
6.4.2 Addit ional support  for specific act ivit ies  
In many countries, additional funding has been allocated to activities such as investment in 
public infrastructure and R&D, and these resources may benefit some regions more than 
others. Nevertheless, funding is generally allocated on national policy grounds, rather than 
to support the development of individual regions. In other countries, governments are 
already cutting some components of public infrastructure spending; in Bulgaria and Ireland, 
the suspension or cancellation of transport infrastructure projects is seen as likely to have a 
negative effect on the development of individual regions or localities. 
In most countries (e.g. Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, UK), the allocation (or 
acceleration) of funding for large infrastructure projects does not have an explicit regional 
dimension, with projects mainly being selected on the basis of their technical capacity to 
start quickly, as well as their socio-economic importance, rather than their location. The 
allocation of funding is therefore likely to be geographically uneven. In the Netherlands, for 
example, measures to prepare for a new Delta programme to strengthen sea defences are 
likely mainly to benefit the South-West, while funding under the Economic Structure 
Enhancing Fund is allocated to major projects of national importance. However, there is 
some attempt to ensure a degree of regional evenness in the allocation of infrastructure 
funding in some countries. In France, efforts have been made to ensure that at least one 
major transport project is selected in each region, although not to achieve a balanced 
distribution of funding, with significant funding being allocated, for example, to Ile-de-
France.69 Similarly, in Norway, the government has stressed that the additional funding for 
infrastructure at municipal and central State levels will have a good regional balance.70  
Further funding is allocated to R&D and innovation in a number of countries (e.g. France, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, UK). Although this funding is not explicitly focused 
on any types of region, demand is likely to be geographically uneven, as the location of 
R&D activities is typically concentrated in a small number of agglomerations with good links 
to external markets and to R&D excellence in universities and public research centres. In 
the Netherlands, for example, central State support to employ business researchers 
temporarily in universities or public research centres was introduced in response to 
requests from the South-East region where many R&D jobs are located.71 Other R&D and 
innovation measures are also likely to have a particular resonance in the South-East of the 
Netherlands.72 Similarly, in the UK, funding for R&D is likely to be taken up in particular by 
firms and researchers in London and South East England which enjoy the highest 
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concentration of the UKs research-intensive universities and firms.73 In addition, the 
creation of a new entrepreneurship scheme in Norway is in practice likely to focuses on the 
big cities (such as Oslo, Bergen and Stavanger) since funding was already available to 
support entrepreneurship elsewhere. In contrast, in Ireland, the Border, Midland and West 
region has in the past had difficulties in absorbing funds for R&D and innovation (notably 
from the Structural Funds) and so are less likely to benefit from the central governments 
decision to focus public resources more strongly on R&D and innovation than are other 
regions. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
7.1 How long will the recovery take? 
There remains significant uncertainty over the shape of economic recovery. Although the 
EU as a whole is estimated to have moved out of recession by the third quarter in 2009 (see 
Table 3), it is not yet clear whether this recovery will spread throughout the international 
economy or whether it can be sustained. In particular, there is considerable uncertainty 
over the impact of ongoing increases in unemployment on consumption, as well as over the 
effect of continued weaknesses in credit provision on business investment.74 
Various possible broad scenarios can be envisaged for the recovery. Although still possible, 
it now seems less likely that the recession will turn into depression, a deflationary cycle 
and an intensified downward spiral. Some observers suggest that a relatively fast (U-
shaped) recovery is possible, based on effective fiscal and monetary stimuli, leading to 
increased confidence and an upturn in consumption and investment. Others argue that it is 
more likely that a volatile (W-shaped) period of uncertainty will ensue with fluctuating 
confidence and economic momentum. Scope for optimism is constrained by the perception 
that recessions associated with financial crises, and also recessions that are synchronised 
across countries, are more likely to be severe and long-lasting than other types of 
recession.75 In any case, recovery is likely to be longer and more difficult in those countries 
which have been most seriously affected by the crisis. 
The recovery is at present being sustained by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, as 
well as by inventory adjustments, and significant economic weaknesses remain.76 There 
remain questions over the functioning of financial markets and, in some countries, further 
work is needed to restructure banks and their balance sheets. As a consequence, bank 
lending to businesses and households remains constrained, acting as a brake on economic 
activity. Persistently weak demand means that further firms are likely to go bankrupt and 
more workers, also in surviving firms, are likely to lose their jobs, and this may continue to 
mute household spending and also lead to further falls in house prices in some countries. 
International discussions are now underway over the need to develop exit strategies from 
countries existing expansionary macroeconomic policies. There are concerns that fiscal and 
monetary policies should not be tightened too soon, nor in all countries at once, and also 
that measures are in place to address the imbalances generated by these expansionary 
policies. 
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7.2 Will the crisis have structural effects? 
An important question is whether the crisis will stimulate longer-term structural changes in 
the international economy. A number of potential structural effects could be envisaged at 
European or broader international scales. 
First, the crisis-based deterioration in public finances in many countries is likely to shape 
public policy in the medium-term. Without a significant recovery in private sector activity 
and associated tax revenues, the level of outstanding public debt will place a major 
constraint on public sector activity in many countries as governments face higher interest 
payments and, particularly outside the Euro area, concerns over credit worthiness and 
currency speculation. Moreover, higher public sector indebtedness will have potentially 
significant knock-on effects on private sector activity through higher taxes, lower 
government spending and, particularly outside the Euro area, interest rate and exchange 
rate uncertainty. Governments will therefore need to find ways of reducing public 
indebtedness without endangering the economic recovery. Although some countries have 
already agreed clear plans for reducing the government deficit and gross public debt (e.g. 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands), it is likely that any public spending cuts or tax rises will be 
phased in, partly because many of the fiscal measures introduced by Member States are in 
any case scheduled to last until the end of 2010, but also because governments are aware 
of the need to take a gradual approach to shifts in fiscal and monetary policies. In any case, 
the need for fiscal constraints will be less acute if countries see sustained increases in GDP 
(as public indebtedness is measured relative to GDP), and also in those countries where 
government support for the financial sector has mainly been in the form of guarantees and 
where banks have not needed to draw significantly on these guarantees. Clearly, future 
constraints will also depend on the scale of countries fiscal stimuli, as well as the degree 
of public indebtedness before the crisis. 
Second, the crisis was triggered by product innovations in the financial sector and it spread 
due to process innovations in that sector in the form of extensive and close international 
linkages. It remains to be seen whether significant changes will be seen in the role of this 
sector, either due to stricter national and international regulation, or due to shifts in the 
strategies of financial institutions, or due to increased caution on the part of businesses and 
households. As economic growth in some countries has been facilitated by the rapid 
expansion of credit in recent years, any significant structural change in the availability or 
take-up of borrowing would have long-term effects on growth rates and also on the 
distribution of economic activity across sectors. It seems likely that the savings rate in 
these countries will rise in coming years, as businesses and households pay off existing 
debts and endeavour to build up financial cushions against further potential shocks. 
Third, the crisis could have an effect on future patterns of EU integration, by influencing 
countries attitudes towards the need for international coordination. Although countries 
have succeeded in cooperating during the crisis, the longer-term impact on governments 
willingness to develop common solutions is as yet unclear. One dimension of this issue 
concerns the extension of Euro area membership. The crisis may not only make it more 
difficult for some central European and Baltic countries (e.g. Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania) to meet the conditions of the EUs Stability and Growth Pact with a view to 
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joining the Euro area, but could also reinforce questions about the advisability of Euro area 
constraints on countries undergoing rapid economic catching-up. However, it is also 
possible (particularly if Slovakia and Slovenia emerge well from the crisis) that the 
recession will increase the attractiveness of the stability offered by Euro area membership. 
Fourth, the crisis may contribute to longer-term shifts in international economics. The 
present economic difficulties can be seen as part of a broader rebalancing in the pattern of 
global demand between net debtor countries (e.g. the United States) and creditor countries 
(e.g. China).77 However, one potentially serious brake on medium-term economic growth is 
that, while demand is likely to remain low for some time in the United States and other 
countries where asset bubbles have burst (as governments, businesses and households 
increase their saving and pay off debt), it is hard to see which other countries will drive 
international demand.  
Lastly, the crisis has raised questions over the sustainability of current patterns of 
international economic activity, and thus links to broader debates on the need for more 
radical shifts in economic relations and, particularly, on the desirability of finding ways of 
moving towards more environmentally and socially sustainable forms of economic 
behaviour. 
7.3 Will the crisis have long term effects on regional development?  
The impact of the crisis on different regions has varied, depending on the national 
economic situation, on the regions initial economic situation and on their sectoral 
structure. Even though the crisis has been rooted in innovation and internationalisation in 
the financial services sector, there is as yet no evidence that (mainly metropolitan) regions 
specialising in this sector have been particularly badly affected, nor that the economic 
importance of these regions is diminishing.  
Indeed, while all regions have been affected to some extent, the strongest impact has in 
general been seen in structurally weaker regions and in manufacturing regions. The longer 
term impact of the crisis on these regions is likely to vary. Although the past year has 
demonstrated the vulnerability of specialised manufacturing regions to external shocks, 
such regions should be well-placed to recover, once domestic and international demand 
rises again. Indeed, these regions are often key to broader national and European economic 
growth. In the case of structurally weaker regions, however, there is a risk that the loss of 
jobs and firms in the recession could lead to structurally lower levels of employment and 
economic activity, as other firms are less likely to set up or expand in these regions, even 
once the upturn comes. In addition, the importance of public employment and transfers in 
such regions means that they will be more vulnerable to future public spending cuts aimed 
at reducing debts incurred in recent months.  
The impact of the crisis on regional policy is also likely to vary between countries. While 
regional policy has been an element of the response to the crisis in some countries, funding 
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for regional policy instruments has been cut in others. It is likely that funding for regional 
development will be constrained in many countries in the medium-term, along with other 
public spending categories, as governments endeavour to reduce public indebtedness. In 
such a context, policy-makers may need to find ways of increasing the effectiveness and 
value-for-money of regional policy, for example by further emphasising collaborative, 
bottom-up approaches that mobilise existing actors and resources. There may also be a 
need to emphasise the contribution of regional policy to national economic growth, for 
instance by further shifting resources towards R&D, innovation and human capital. Less 
certain is the effect of the temporary loosening of EU State aid rules to allow aid to firms in 
all regions. If these looser rules were extended for a longer period than envisaged at 
present, they would clearly weaken the advantage which regional State aid designation 
seeks to confer on structurally weaker regions. 
Nevertheless, perhaps one of the key lessons of the crisis is the extent of economic 
interdependencies between regions and countries, and the need for international and 
interregional cooperation and coordination to address common problems. Similarly, the 
crisis emphasises the importance of government intervention  in the form of both 
monetary and fiscal policy - in mitigating economic weaknesses, whether at household, 
regional or international levels. 
